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Secret Law 
JONATHAN MANES* 
The law cannot be a secret hidden from the public. This proposition strikes 
most of us as uncontroversial—a basic premise of any legal order committed to 
democratic accountability and the rule of law. Yet in this country secret law not 
only exists, but has become an entrenched feature of contemporary national 
security governance. From NSA surveillance to terrorist watch lists to targeted 
killings, the most controversial national security programs of our time have all 
been governed by secret rules, secret directives, and secret legal interpretations. 
This Article sheds new light on this deeply unsettling state of affairs. It 
pushes beyond a reflexive aversion to secret law to unpack the underlying 
normative principles that both militate against secret law and motivate its 
widespread use. Secret law poses grave threats to basic values of democratic 
accountability, individual liberty, and separation of powers, but it also serves 
pragmatic national security purposes. By clarifying these competing values, it is 
possible to identify a number of distinct characteristics that make a given 
example of secret law especially odious—or essentially benign. This Article thus 
offers a systematic rubric for evaluating particular instances of secret law. 
This Article also provides the first systematic review of the legal ecosystem 
that governs secret law in the Executive Branch—what I call the “law of secret 
law.” The picture that emerges is startling: existing law gives the Executive 
Branch enormous discretion to keep law secret. Indeed, the courts have effec­
tively endorsed the practice of secret law, and Congress has been almost 
entirely quiescent in its face. 
This Article proposes a novel reform agenda to transform this permissive 
legal ecosystem into one that more adequately protects transparency values. It 
offers core principles for a new framework statute limiting the practice of secret 
law. In addition, it argues that courts can and should prompt democratic 
deliberation over secret law (and legislative reconsideration of the status quo) 
by adopting a constitutional clear statement rule against secret law that is 
grounded in the text and structure of the Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law cannot be a secret hidden from the public. This proposition strikes 
most of us as uncontroversial—a basic premise of any legal order committed to 
democratic accountability and the rule of law. The idea that the very rules that 
empower and constrain the government could be kept secret from the public— 
immune from its scrutiny and democratic deliberation—is deeply troubling. Yet 
in this country secret law not only exists, but has become an entrenched feature 
of contemporary national security governance. Indeed, over the past fifteen 
years the government has consistently, vigorously, and openly defended its 
authority to adopt and maintain secret legal rules; the courts have often en­
dorsed this practice; and Congress has been almost entirely quiescent in its face. 
Over and over in the post-9/11 era, the story of national security policymak­
ing has been the story of secret law. The most controversial programs initiated 
in response to the contemporary threat of terrorism have been founded upon 
secret legal rules, secret legal interpretations, secret legal directives, or some 
combination of the three. Although the notion of secret law is startling, there is 
no doubt that it has become a regular part of national security governance. A 
brief recitation of recent programs establishes this alarming claim. 
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the administration of President George W. 
Bush enacted a policy of warrantless domestic surveillance, apparently flouting 
criminal prohibitions on domestic spying by intelligence agencies.1 
See generally OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF  DEF. ET AL., REP. NO. 2009-0013-AS, 
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s 
0907.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN3M-HYYQ] [hereinafter PSP REPORT] (discussing the creation and under­
lying policies of the President’s Surveillance Program); see also Morton H. Halperin & Jerry Berman, A 
Legal Analysis of the NSA Warrantless Surveillance Program, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 3–4 (Jan. 
17, 2006), https://www.cdt.org/files/security/nsa/20060117halperinberman.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK7M­
2359]. 
It did so by 
1. 
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adopting novel and aggressive legal interpretations in secret.2 Soon thereafter, 
the government adopted the use of torture—euphemistically dubbed “enhanced 
interrogation”—up to and including waterboarding.3 
See generally S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014), https://www.congress.gov/ 
113/crpt/srpt288/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7JY-FQA2] (evaluating the CIA’s use of 
“enhanced interrogation”); LARRY SIEMS, THE TORTURE REPORT: WHAT THE DOCUMENTS SAY ABOUT 
AMERICA’S POST-9/11 TORTURE PROGRAM (2011) (providing a meticulous account of the Bush-era torture 
program based on thousands of government documents). 
It authorized and governed 
this program by again adopting novel and aggressive legal interpretations in 
secret.4 
See A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES (2005), http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/ 
24MEMO-GUIDE.html [https://perma.cc/Q3AU-BCY8]; Andrew Cohen, The Torture Memos, 10 Years 
Later, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/02/the-torture-memos­
10-years-later/252439 [https://perma.cc/X9BW-H25G]. 
In 2003, the government created a sizable new agency within the FBI to 
administer a massive terrorist watch list.5 
See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST 
SCREENING CENTER (2005), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4Q6­
NJHC] [hereinafter DOJ-OIG 2005] (discussing the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center to 
synthesize numerous terrorist watch lists). 
That watch list in turn spawned more 
specific watch lists like the No-Fly List, which strips individuals of their ability 
to fly in U.S. airspace.6 The basic rules governing the No-Fly List and other 
lists—such as what it takes to be added or removed—were kept secret from the 
public.7 After the original secret warrantless wiretapping program was exposed 
by The New York Times,8 
See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts. 
html [https://nyti.ms/2k90zpQ]. 
the government continued many of its dragnet 
surveillance programs on the basis of secret law.9 For instance, the National 
Security Agency’s (NSA) mass telephone call tracking program—the first pro­
gram revealed as a result of the Snowden disclosures10
See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 
37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 759–60 (2014); Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of 
Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/9SAX-W3LK]. 
—was based upon novel, 
aggressive, and secret statutory interpretations issued by the Foreign Intelli­
gence Surveillance Court (FISC) starting in 2006.11 A bulk email-tracking 
program was likewise based upon secret FISC rulings.12 
2. See PSP REPORT, supra note 1, at 5–14 (discussing the adoption of “new, highly classified 
intelligence activities” authorized by President Bush, including authorized interceptions of international 
communications). 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. See id. at 99–100. 
7. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141 & n.3 (D. Or. 2014). 
8. 
9. See PSP REPORT, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
10. 
11. See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order No. BR 0605 1, 2 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). See generally 
Donohue, supra note 10 (analyzing, in depth, the telephone call tracking program). 
12. See Press Release, James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Clapper Declassifies 
Additional Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (Nov. 18, 2013), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/67419963949/dni­
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clapper-declassifies-additional-intelligence [https://perma.cc/RAK8-8MA2]; Press Release, Office of 
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the Now-Discontinued NSA Bulk 
Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2014/item/ 
1099-newly-declassified-documents-regarding-the-now-discontinued-nsa-bulk-electronic-communications­
metadata-pursuant-to-section-402-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act [https://perma.cc/QN93-T282]. 
The practice of secret law continued into the administration of President 
Barack Obama. By the end of 2009, it was apparent that the government’s 
counterterrorism efforts had begun to rely more heavily on targeted killings. 
Drone strikes were frequently targeting individuals well beyond the borders of 
the hot battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan.13 The legal framework governing 
these uses of lethal force was secret. Perhaps most startling of all, the govern­
ment claimed and deployed the legal authority to kill even U.S. citizens14—in 
2011, the government targeted and killed a U.S. citizen away from any tradi­
tional battlefield as a counterterrorism measure.15 
See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2014); see Dominic 
Rushe et al., Anwar al-Awlaki Death: US Keeps Role Under Wraps to Manage Yemen Fallout, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2011, 2:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-awlaki­
yemen [https://perma.cc/ZVL6-SVF2]. 
But even this awesome 
assertion of power by the government was exercised according to legal rules 
and standards that the public was not permitted to know.16 
Secret law is real, and it is has become an important and unsettling tool of 
national security governance. Of course, nobody disputes that the government 
must be permitted to implement aspects of its national security policy in secret; 
counterterrorism, military, and intelligence activities often require secrecy to be 
effective. But the notion that the rules governing such programs may also be 
secret is deeply troubling. An analogy from the context of ordinary criminal law 
enforcement is instructive: We do not flinch at the idea of a particular search 
warrant or surveillance order being issued under seal, that is, in secret. But the 
notion that the law of government searches and surveillance—the Fourth Amend­
ment doctrines, statutes, and interpretations that govern this activity—could 
also be secret is intolerable.17 Yet in the national security context, the rules that 
govern are often secret. 
How can this be? This Article appraises and illuminates this unsettling state 
of affairs, focusing on the use of secret law in the Executive Branch.18 First, this 
13. See THE DRONE MEMOS: TARGETED KILLING, SECRECY, AND THE LAW (Jameel Jaffer ed., 2016) 
(describing the Obama era targeted killing program and the context in which the secret legal framework 
governing targeted killings was developed). 
14. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2010). 
15. 
16. N.Y. Times Co., 756 F.3d at 103. 
17. Cf. Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41  
U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 605–06, 619–20, 624–25 (2007) (discussing ex parte applications for certain pen 
register surveillance orders, cell phone tracking orders, and “internet pen registers”). 
18. Other authors have recently undertaken to examine secret law and have focused on the growth of 
secret law in Congress and the courts, as well as the Executive Branch. Dakota Rudesill authored an 
excellent and nuanced examination of the practice and problems of secret law that includes, among 
other novel contributions, the most authoritative treatment of Congress’s practice of enacting legislation 
that is kept secret from the public. See Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. 
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Article unearths the basic principles and values that secret law offends, as well 
as the purposes that secret law serves. Second, based on this discussion, this 
Article describes a novel and systematic rubric for evaluating whether and to 
what extent any given secret law is problematic. Third, this Article provides a 
synoptic view of the legal ecosystem that governs secret law, or what I call the 
“law of secret law.” Finally, it proposes a reform agenda to transform this legal 
ecosystem, which currently allows secret law to flourish, into one that strictly 
limits secret law to circumstances where it is justified according to stringent and 
public standards. 
This Article seeks to push beyond a reflexive aversion to secret law to unpack 
the underlying normative principles that both militate against secret law and 
motivate its widespread use in the national security context. By clarifying these 
competing principles, it is possible to identify distinct characteristics of specific 
secret laws that make them particularly odious—or particularly benign. Specifi­
cally, this Article argues that certain secret laws can be assessed along five axes, 
each of which describes a key characteristic of a given secret law. These axes 
are (1) the extent of external effects, (2) the novelty and unforeseeability, (3) the 
level of granularity at which the law is disclosed, (4) the expected duration of 
secrecy, and (5) the depth or extent of secrecy. This Article contends that secret 
laws are more problematic to the extent that they lie toward the extremes of one 
or more of these axes. This multifactor test for assessing secret laws illuminates 
what is really at stake in disagreements about the legitimacy of secret law, 
moving beyond both a blanket rejection of secret law and a complete deference 
to national security secrecy. Instead, debates about the legitimacy of a given 
instance of secret law can more usefully be understood as disagreements about 
where a secret law should lie along one or more of these axes—for example, 
NAT’L SEC. J. 241 (2015). In addition, the Brennan Center for Justice published a remarkable report on 
the problem of secret law that, among many other contributions, includes the most comprehensive 
compilation of secret Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions that constitute governing law for the 
Executive Branch. See ELIZABETH GOITEIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW ERA OF SECRET LAW 
(2016). Jonathan Hafetz authored an incisive and thoughtful examination of secret law that focuses, in 
particular, on how such laws often take the form of fluid and indeterminate standards that tend to 
expand discretion. See Jonathan Hafetz, A Problem of Standards?: Another Perspective on Secret Law, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2141 (2016). Sudha Setty critiqued the practice of secret law from a historical 
and comparative perspective. See Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive 
Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 KAN. L. REV. 579 (2009). The problem of secret 
law in the courts—which can arise when courts seal their judicial opinions in full or part—has also 
received some scholarly attention. See, e.g., Bankston, supra note 17 (discussing sealed judicial 
opinions that elaborate legal standards governing various forms of electronic surveillance); Orin S. 
Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 1513, 1525 (2014) 
(observing that secret decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court have produced “a body 
of secret law that seems removed from what a majority of the public would approve”); Michael A. Sall, 
Note, Classified Opinions: Habeas at Guanta´namo and the Creation of Secret Law, 101 GEO. L.J. 1147, 
1159–61 (2013) (arguing that judicial opinions in Guantanamo Bay habeas proceedings can establish 
secret legal rules because such opinions are often heavily redacted to excise classified information, 
thereby obscuring the precise contours of the legal rules that have been developed and elaborated in 
those cases). 
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whether a secret law’s external effects on the public are direct and significant 
enough that secrecy is intolerable, or whether the rules developed in secret 
should be disclosed in more granular detail.19 
This Article is the first to attempt a systematic description of the law of secret 
law—that is, the ecosystem of legal rules that govern the practice of secret law 
in the Executive Branch, including the Due Process Clause, the Federal Register 
Act, and the Freedom of Information Act.20 The upshot of this survey is that 
there are, in practice, few legal constraints on the creation of secret law. The law 
of secret law essentially gives the Executive Branch discretion to determine 
whether and when the rules governing national security programs can be 
shielded from the public and, thus, ordinary democratic oversight. 
This legal ecosystem produces an equilibrium in which secret law prolifer­
ates. Current legal arrangements vastly undervalue the principles that militate 
against secret law. Moreover, they produce an equilibrium that is not only 
suboptimal, but also unstable. National security leaks like the Snowden disclo­
sures bring secret law into the light in fitful, unpredictable, and episodic ways. 
Indeed, the Snowden disclosures were so momentous and disruptive precisely 
because they revealed a body of law that had, for years, secretly empowered the 
intelligence community in unforeseeable ways. 
The law of secret law must be reformed to reset this equilibrium. This Article 
proposes that Congress impose stringent limits that would be binding on the 
Executive Branch and enforceable by the courts. This Article offers a novel 
roadmap to obtain such reforms, arguing that courts should initiate legislative 
reconsideration of secret law by recognizing that secret laws raise grave constitu­
tional concerns and should not be permitted unless Congress has clearly autho­
rized them. Indeed, as this Article will show, constitutional text, doctrine, and 
structure support the notion that the Constitution is hostile to secret law in the 
Executive Branch.21 
If courts were to recognize this kind of constitutional “clear statement rule” 
against secret law, they would effectively put the question of secret law to 
Congress—if not outright prohibit it themselves. In other words, the courts 
would be prompting a public and democratic deliberation about the second­
19. Cf. Hafetz, supra note 18. Hafetz argues that the problem of secret law is often better regarded as 
a problem of inadequately specified legal standards that leave too much room for discretion. Id. at 
2150–52. On this account, the problem is not that the rules are not disclosed at a sufficiently granular 
level, but that there are not sufficiently granular rules to disclose in the first place. Id. 
20. Jameel Jaffer and Brett Max Kaufman recently offered a trenchant examination of the “working 
law doctrine” under FOIA, which is one important aspect of the law of secret law. See Jameel Jaffer & 
Brett Max Kaufman, A Resurgence of Secret Law, 126 YALE L.J. F. 242 (2016). 
21. This argument builds upon existing literature exploring the constitutional limits on secrecy in the 
Executive Branch. See, e.g., MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (Univ. Press of Kan., 3d ed., 2010) (1994); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated 
Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 514–15, 542–43 (2007); David E. Pozen, 
Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional 
Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909 (2006). 
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order question of when law can be kept secret and thus immune from public and 
democratic oversight. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly issued this kind of “democracy-forcing” 
decision in its post-9/11 national security cases22
See Josh Benson, The Guanta´namo Game: A Public Choice Perspective on Judicial Review in 
Wartime, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1264–73 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. 
REV. 47, 53–54 (“Courts should require clear congressional authorization before the [E]xecutive 
intrudes on interests that have a strong claim to constitutional protection.”); Jack M. Balkin, Hamdan as 
a Democracy-Forcing Decision, BALKINIZATION (June 29, 2006), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/ 
hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision.html [https://perma.cc/L4CZ-GH2F]. 
—similar intervention is neces­
sary here. As it stands, we have stumbled into a system that permits secret law 
essentially at will in the national security context. The courts should, at a 
minimum, require our democratic institutions to make an explicit, public deci­
sion about whether and when secret law is justified. In the absence of meaning­
ful reform, we invite further creeping expansion of secret law, and we risk a 
Kafkaesque state of affairs in which the public cannot know the rules by which 
the government is playing. 
* * *  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I defines key terms, explaining what I 
mean by “secret law” and why we should regard these kinds of internal 
Executive Branch rules as “law.” Part II explores the normative terrain of secret 
law, identifying three fundamental objections to secret law, as well as the four 
principal rationales offered in its defense. Part III offers a systematic rubric for 
assessing whether a given secret law is justifiable. Part IV is a synoptic tour of 
the legal landscape in which secret law has taken root—what I call the “law 
of secret law.” Finally, Part V offers a reform agenda to address the problem of 
secret law and begins to sketch constitutional arguments that can be mounted 
against the practice of secret law in the Executive Branch. 
I. SECRET LAW DEFINED 
To examine the normative and legal ecosystem that governs secret law, it is 
necessary to provide a firmer account of what exactly constitutes “secret law” as 
I use the phrase. Why does it make sense to regard internal Executive Branch 
texts as “laws,” rather than something else—perhaps secret “guidance” or secret 
“advice”? What does it mean for a law to be “secret”? 
Thus far, this Article has illustrated the concept of secret law through 
examples, such as Department of Justice (DOJ) memos assessing the legality of 
targeted killings or torture, legal directives elaborating surveillance rules, and 
manuals setting forth the rules for placing individuals on terrorism watch lists. 
What makes each of these an instance of “law”? 
In my view, these and other internal administrative texts constitute “law” if 
they articulate rules or principles of general applicability that are regarded by 
22. 
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the relevant officials as binding on their conduct.23 This is an explicitly func­
tional and sociological approach to what counts as law. Whether a legal text 
constitutes law will depend on whether, as a matter of social fact, it plays a 
certain role—specifying general rules or principles of conduct—for the relevant 
government officials. 
This definition is purposely indifferent to the particular form in which the 
rule or principle is embodied or whether the legal text in question is denomi­
nated as a “rule,” “directive,” “opinion,” “manual,” or otherwise. What matters 
is the social function of the text. Thus, a “memorandum” issued by a senior 
official to govern the conduct of subordinates is an example of law, as I use the 
term, so long as it sets out rules or principles of general applicability, as 
opposed to, say, delivering a specific order to carry out a particular action. 
On this definition, Executive Branch legal opinions that are regarded as 
authoritative and binding by government officials count as law. More specifi­
cally, formal opinions of the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) are law 
because such opinions are—as a matter of practice and sociological fact— 
regarded as “binding within the [E]xecutive [B]ranch unless ‘overruled’ by the 
Attorney General or the President.”24 Likewise, a manual setting forth the rules 
by which government officials are to administer a program is law if the manual 
is regarded as binding by the officials administering the program. 
This understanding of what constitutes a law makes sense for the purposes of 
this Article, which aims to investigate the secrecy of the rules according to 
which the government actually operates in dealings that affect the public. In this 
context, what matters is whether the legal texts in question actually function as 
authoritative rules that empower or constrain the government. 
But this definition of law is not simply convenient for this Article’s purposes; 
it is also broadly consistent with modern philosophical conceptions of law. This 
definition is particularly likely to resonate with legal positivists, who emphasize 
that whether a particular norm constitutes law depends on facts about the world, 
particularly sociological facts about what rules the relevant community will 
recognize as valid and binding.25 That said, accepting my working definition of 
23. For an example of a more formal definition of law, see 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012), which defines a 
“rule” for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
24. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1711 & nn.90–91 (2011) 
(book review) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)) 
(“OLC generally will not provide legal advice if there is doubt about whether it will be followed.”); see 
also Jaffer & Kaufman, supra note 20. 
25. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed., 2012) (discussing law as a social 
construction); Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1161–65 
(2006) (describing H.L.A. Hart’s account of social rules in term of rules that groups regard as binding 
from the internal point of view). Many positivist accounts of law also rely on a version of the “rule of 
recognition”—in other words, the acceptance of second-order rules that identify which primary rules 
are binding. In contrast with formalized rules that identify valid laws passed by Congress or elaborated 
by courts, second-order rules that identify internal laws within the Executive Branch are less stylized 
and uniform. There is nevertheless little doubt that general agreement exists about which internal rules 
are binding. “Both inside and outside of administration, agency rules, practices, and precedents are 
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law does not necessarily require a commitment to legal positivism because it is 
not inconsistent with (at least some) contemporary natural law theorists’ jurispru­
dential views.26 
The use of the term law in this way may strike a dissonant note to some ears 
because such internal rules usually do not directly govern the conduct of the 
public. Instead, they are primarily directed to the conduct of government 
officials and will typically only have second-order effects on the public.27 In 
addition, the laws at issue here are developed within the Executive Branch, in 
contrast with legal rules enacted by Congress or prescribed in judicial opinions. 
Moreover, unlike more familiar species of administrative law—for example, 
rules adopted through notice-and-comment, agency circulars, and “publication 
rules”28—these internal laws often escape judicial review or any other require­
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because they concern national 
security matters.29 
Using the term “law” in this context may be uncommon, but it is by no means 
an innovation. The notion that internal agency rules, practices, and precedents 
constitute an “internal law of administration” dates back to the first treatise on 
American administrative law, penned by Bruce Wyman in 1903.30 Although 
contemporary study of administrative law tends to focus on the “external law” 
of statutes and court decisions that constrain agencies and subject agency law to 
judicial oversight, internal rules and practices—even those not adopted through 
formal or informal rulemaking—continue to play an essential role in administra­
taken both to have normative force and to be subject to normative critique concerning whether they 
instantiate an appropriate vision of lawful administration.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration 
and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1471 (2010); see Elizabeth Magill, 
Foreword, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 861 (2009). 
26. Modern natural law theorists, such as Lon Fuller, are not primarily concerned with identifying 
the social facts or practices that distinguish law from other norms; instead they argue that to qualify as 
law, a system of rules must meet certain moral criteria. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW (Yale Univ. rev. ed. 1969). Fuller argued that one of the eight principles essential to the “internal 
morality of law” was that laws, properly so-called, must be made known to the public. See id. at 45, 
49–51, 93. On this view, a system of laws in which the law is kept secret is essentially illegitimate—it 
doesn’t satisfy the moral requirements of law. Id. at 49–51. 
For purposes of this project, however, it would beg the question against the legitimacy of secret law 
simply to posit that law must be public to be legitimate. The point of this Article is to examine the 
special case where law is known only to government officials and not to the public. Indeed, Fuller 
himself acknowledged that there may be circumstances in which “we must bow to grim necessity” and 
keep law secret. Id. at 92. I thus employ a definition of law that does not include disclosure to the public 
as a sine qua non. 
27. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984) (distinguishing between “decision rules” directed to 
officials and “conduct rules” directed to the public). 
28. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553 (2012); Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41  
DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466–68 (2002). 
29. See Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. L. REV. 883, 883 (2014) 
(explaining that a “national security exception from notice-and-comment” in the APA “insulate[s] most 
national security rulemaking from public scrutiny and meaningful judicial review”). 
30. See generally BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE 
RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903). 
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tive governance. Jerry Mashaw has long stressed the crucial and underappreci­
ated role of such “internal law.”31 Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack have 
likewise revived and defended the idea of “internal administrative law” as a 
distinctive form of law.32 Following these authors, I take the view that such 
internal norms, which pervasively structure and govern bureaucracies, have a 
philosophical and pragmatic claim to the status of law similar to the varieties of 
“external” law that are more commonly studied in the literature.33 
In addition to clarifying how I use the term “law,” it is worth explaining what 
constitutes a “secret” law. I use the term “secret” to refer to laws that are not 
officially made available to the general public. For instance, an Executive 
Branch legal opinion that is shared with both Congress and the courts consti­
tutes a secret law unless it has been disclosed to the broader public. 
Of course, there are degrees of secrecy: secrecy varies to the extent that the 
law in question is disseminated within the Executive Branch, across branches of 
government, or even with subsets of the public.34 Thus, for instance, one might 
ask whether a classified FISC opinion still counts as a secret law if it has been 
shared with security-cleared lawyers outside of the government who work for 
the telecommunications companies directed to carry out the surveillance but 
who are subject to a strict nondisclosure obligation. On my account, even this 
species of law constitutes a secret law because the rules in question cannot be 
shared with the general public. 
Variations in the degree of secrecy certainly matter, as I discuss below, but 
because the purpose of this Article is to explore whether and when the general 
public can be kept in the dark about what the law is, I reserve the phrase “secret 
law” to describe those cases where the public at large is shut out. 
II. SECRET LAW IN THE BALANCE 
This Part explores the normative terrain upon which disputes about secret law 
are contested. It first sets out the principal arguments against secret law, which 
fall into three clusters: threats to individual liberty, democratic deficits, and 
separation of powers concerns. 
It then discusses the principal rationales that have been advanced in favor of 
secret law: maintaining the secrecy of sensitive government programs, prevent­
ing circumvention or otherwise increasing a program’s effectiveness, insulating 
31. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 25, at 1412–15; Jerry L. Mashaw, Foreword, The American Model 
of Federal Administrative Law: Remembering the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975 
(2010); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the 
Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007). 
32. See generally Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.  
REV. 1239 (2017). 
33. See Mashaw, supra note 25; Metzger & Stack, supra note 32, at 1256–63; see also Magill, supra 
note 25, at 861. 
34. See Pozen, supra note 21, at 262–75 (offering a subtle exploration of the degrees of secrecy in 
government). 
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laws from public opposition, and protecting the deliberative capacity of 
government. 
A. THE TROUBLE WITH SECRET LAW 
1. Secret Law as a Threat to Individual Liberty and to Limits on Government 
Powers 
Where the law is secret, individuals may not understand the legal conse­
quences of their actions or what restraints the government must respect in its 
dealings with them. When the government operates according to secret rules, it 
may appear to ordinary members of the public that officials are acting arbi­
trarily, lawlessly, or unpredictably. Members of the public will be left to guess at 
the limits on the government’s authority, the rules it must follow, what official 
consequences might flow from particular actions, and what kinds of activity 
might arouse government scrutiny. 
The result may be a significant chilling effect on individual liberties. As the 
courts have recognized with respect to free speech rights, where a law that 
relates to speech is unclear, “it operates to inhibit the exercise of [First Amend­
ment] freedoms” because “[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer 
far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas 
were clearly marked.”35 The same is true with respect to other liberties: Where 
the government operates according to secret rules, individuals may be deterred 
from engaging in all manner of lawful activities they fear might subject them to 
government scrutiny, interference, or other negative consequences.36 
Even where individuals are not actually deterred by the specter of secret law, 
there is nevertheless significant harm to individual liberty. Governance accord­
ing to secret law will often be experienced by individuals as inscrutable, 
arbitrary, and oppressive. This is because secret law, in essence, shifts the 
ordinary balance of power between citizens and the government decisively in 
favor of the latter. When the law is public, an individual can determine whether 
a government action is unlawful and contest it. When a police officer makes a 
traffic stop, for instance, the driver can know the rules of the game, what rights 
she retains, and what legal options are available to her in responding to the 
officer’s questions or directions. In other words, she can (in principle, at least) 
ascertain the likely consequences of her actions. But when a government official 
acts according to secret laws, the citizen is placed at a grave disadvantage: 
Individuals are unable to dispute what the governing rules require, how they 
should be applied, how they can be avoided, and what consequences can follow 
35. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (internal quotations, footnotes, and 
alterations omitted). 
36. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58  
B.U. L. REV. 685, 689–92 (1978) (discussing the chilling effect with respect to rights beyond free 
speech); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969) (same). 
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from them. When the law is secret, citizens are at the mercy of the government, 
unable to know what the law requires or whether the government is violating it. 
Contemporary government watchlisting programs provide a prime example 
of these problems. The government maintains a database of more than one 
million individuals in its Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment.37 
Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Watch Commander: Barack Obama’s Secret Terrorist-
Tracking System, By the Numbers, INTERCEPT (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:45 PM), https://theintercept.com/2014/ 
08/05/watch-commander [https://perma.cc/G6WL-LM32]. 
Approxi­
mately 680,000 of these people have reportedly been watchlisted as “known or 
suspected terrorists.”38 Thousands of these people are U.S. citizens or perma­
nent residents.39 
Id. (reproducing government document indicating that approximately 20,800 U.S. citizens or 
permanent residents are included in the government’s database, of which 5,000 have been watchlisted); 
see Walter Pincus, 1,600 Are Suggested Daily for the FBI’s List, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/31/AR2009103102141.html [https:// 
perma.cc/XZ6P-L8MT] (“Fewer than 5 percent of the people on the list are U.S. citizens or legal 
permanent residents.”). 
Subsets of those watchlisted are subject to overt restrictions, 
such as being placed on the No-Fly List, which forbids air travel. Other effects 
of watchlisting are more opaque. The watch lists are routinely shared with 
federal agencies, local police, foreign governments, and certain private entities, 
which use them in ways that are unclear to the public.40 When a watchlisted 
individual encounters any such entity, he or she is liable to face, at a minimum, 
increased scrutiny and lengthier questioning,41 
The government’s leaked Watchlisting Guidance directs agencies that “encounter” an individual 
on the watch list to use their existing authorities to collect all manner of information about the 
individual for subsequent addition to the database. See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING 
GUIDANCE 59–71 (2013), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1227228–2013-watchlist-guidance. 
html [https://perma.cc/RR74-FHF9] [hereinafter WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE]; NAT’L CRIME INFO. CTR., 
NCIC 2000 OPERATING MANUAL: KNOWN OR APPROPRIATELY SUSPECTED TERRORIST (KST) FILE § 5.2 (2000) 
(indicating law enforcement officers who encounter a watchlisted person should contact the FBI’s 
Terrorist Screening Center and gather a variety of information, among other steps). 
but often much more serious 
consequences.42
See, e.g., First Amended Complaint ¶ 8, Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(Document No. 15) (alleging the FBI used the threat of continued placement on the No-Fly List to 
coerce Muslim Americans to become informants); Adam Goldman, Lawsuit Alleges FBI Is Using 
No-Fly List to Force Muslims to Become Informants, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawsuit-alleges-fbi-is-using-no-fly-list-to-force-muslims­
to-become-informants/2014/04/22/1a62f566-ca27-11e3-a75e-463587891b57 [https://perma.cc/FN3A­
JB2B]. 
The government sought for years to keep the rules governing this enormously 
complex and consequential apparatus secret.43 The rules only became public in 
July 2014, when they were leaked to journalists.44 
37. 
38. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
39. 
40. Scahill & Devereaux, supra note 37. 
41. 
42. 
43. See WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE, supra note 41, at 1 (indicating that no part of the guidance manual 
may be released because it constitutes “Sensitive Security Information” pursuant to transportation 
security regulations). 
44. See Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret Government Rulebook for 
Labeling You a Terrorist, INTERCEPT (July 23, 2014, 1:45 PM), https://theintercept.com/2014/07/23/ 
blacklisted [https://perma.cc/JM6N-VBR9]; see also March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance, INTERCEPT 
Up until that point the only 
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(July 23, 2014, 2:46 PM), https://theintercept.com/document/2014/07/23/march-2013-watchlisting­
guidance [https://perma.cc/C387-LN52] (publishing the rules). 
legal rule the government had disclosed was that a “reasonable suspicion” 
standard of proof is applied when deciding whether to add individuals to watch 
lists.45 Furthermore, the government had refused to say what a person must be 
reasonably suspected of doing to be added, let alone revealed the detailed 
criteria elaborating upon these requirements or the processes by which such 
decisions are made.46 Nor had the government explained what standard must be 
met for one’s name to be removed from the lists.47 As a result of many years of 
litigation, the government did eventually describe the general criteria governing 
placement on one particular watch list, the No-Fly List, but it still refuses to 
disclose details about the No-Fly List rules and it has not disclosed anything 
about the rules applicable to other watch lists.48 
As a result of this secrecy, individuals have been kept in the dark as to why 
they might be included on a watch list, what they must show to get themselves 
removed, or even the likely consequences of being placed on a watch list. 
Individuals who are improperly watchlisted are unable to point to violations of 
the rules because the rules are secret. The government, in turn, enjoys enormous 
unchecked discretion in how it interprets and applies its secret rules. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the government has at times applied its watchlisting rules ex­
tremely broadly and sloppily.49 
See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE 
TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER xvii–xxii (2007), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0741/final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XJH2-LZQQ] (finding, among other things, that the FBI did not consistently update or 
remove names from the watch list); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/ 
reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM2G-55BJ] (auditing the terrorist watch list and find­
ing, among other things, that many names were not removed when required or failed to be added when 
appropriate); DOJ-OIG 2005, supra note 5, at xi–xv (finding numerous problems with the accuracy and 
completeness of the watch list database). 
In one case, the government put a Stanford 
University graduate student on the No-Fly List because an FBI agent misunder­
stood a routine form and mistakenly designated her for inclusion.50 Despite the 
error, the government fought for years in court to keep her on the list—and to 
prevent her from obtaining judicial review—taking two appeals to the Ninth 
45. See id. 
46. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141 (D. Or. 2014) (“The government also has its own 
‘Watchlisting Guidance’ for internal law-enforcement and intelligence use, and the No-Fly List has its 
own minimum substantive derogatory criteria. The government does not release these documents.”). 
47. See id. 
48. See Latif v. Lynch, No. 10-cv-750, 2016 WL 1239925, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2016) (listing the 
“substantive derogatory criteria” for inclusion in the No-Fly List but noting that other “sublists” in the 
government’s watchlisting system have their own “substantive criteria”); Joint Combined Statement of 
Agreed Facts Relevant to All Plaintiffs ¶¶ 5–6, Latif, No. 10-cv-750, ECF No. 173 (noting that “[t]he 
Government has defined or further elucidated some of the terms used in the criteria for placement on 
the No Fly List in the Watchlisting Guidance, which it has disseminated solely within the U.S. 
Government watchlisting and screening communities”). 
49. 
50. See Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 911, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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Circuit.51 Eight years after the case was filed, following a trial at which the error 
finally came to light, the district court could only describe her treatment by the 
government as “Kafkaesque.”52 
It seems inevitable that the specter of being watchlisted has deterred perfectly 
lawful behavior, particularly in the American Muslim community, which is the 
most affected by such efforts.53 Even if not deterred, individuals who are, or 
who believe they might be, on the watch list live their lives under the forebod­
ing specter of the government’s power and its secret rulebook. 
The same dynamic exists in other areas where secret law regulates govern­
ment activities. Secret rules governing surveillance, for instance, have led 
individuals—particularly journalists and other professionals who owe duties of 
confidentiality—to avoid using various means of communication because they 
cannot be sure whether and how their communications will be protected.54 
There is evidence of more subtle and widespread chilling effects on individual 
behavior.55 
See, e.g., Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31  
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2016) (finding a significant chilling effect following the Snowden disclosures 
by measuring short- and long-term decline in traffic to Wikipedia articles on topics that raise privacy 
concerns); Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior 
(Feb. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (finding a significant chilling effect, both domestically and 
internationally, resulting from government surveillance based on data comparing the frequency of 
searches for private or sensitive information on Google before and after the Snowden revelations), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564 [https://perma.cc/J2MH-GVYJ]. 
Even if there were no empirical chilling effects, where the law is 
secret, individuals live under the threat that they may at any time be caught up 
in programs governed by rules that they are not permitted to learn.56 
2. Thwarting Democratic Accountability and Participation 
Secret law also poses a challenge to democratic principles: If the law in a 
particular area is kept secret from the public, people cannot intelligently exer­
cise their democratic prerogatives with respect to those areas of law. Ordinarily, 
people who support, oppose, or propose changes to a law have many democratic 
tools at their disposal. Not only can they vote for candidates who share their 
views, but they can also take more targeted actions to effect change, such as 
petitioning, organizing, lobbying, fundraising, donating, and advertising. In­
deed, the Constitution specifically guarantees these rights through the petition, 
speech, assembly, and press clauses of the First Amendment.57 
51. See id. at 911–12. 
52. Id. at 931. 
53. See Scahill & Devereaux, supra note 37. 
54. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2013); id. at 424–25 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
55. 
56. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006) (recounting facts relating to 
individual denied boarding flight because of refusal to comply with requirements of secret security 
directives). 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Where the law is secret, however, the democratic apparatus of public account­
ability is short-circuited. If the substance of the law is secret, the public cannot 
have any meaningful input or control over it. 
The situation is particularly grave where not only the substance of the law is 
secret, but where the public is also kept in the dark that a secret law even exists. 
Nobody in 2002 would have rallied to oppose a law permitting waterboarding 
because nobody then knew that the OLC had, in effect, written such a law 
through its legal opinions authorizing the technique despite the criminal prohibi­
tion against torture.58 
See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S 
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, S. REP. NO. 113-288, at xiii–xv 
(2014), https://www.congress.gov/113/crpt/srpt288/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7JY-FQ 
A2]; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to 
the President (Aug. 1, 2002), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7PHX-K72F]. 
When the existence of the law is kept secret, the most the 
public can hope for is that officials making the law pause to imagine what the 
public would think of the law if it were disclosed, and that this private thought 
experiment—perhaps combined with the possibility of future disclosure—has 
an effect on officials’ decision making. In this sense, secret lawmakers are only 
accountable to a hypothetical public. 
Even where the public knows that a secret law exists, democratic oversight is 
severely weakened. It is simply impossible to effectively manipulate the levers 
of democratic oversight when one is forced to speculate about what the law 
says. 
Take, for instance, the example of surveillance pursuant to section 215 of the 
USA PATRIOT Act.59 Under that law, the public knew that the FISC, on 
application from the FBI, could issue orders for disclosure of “tangible things” 
that were “relevant to an authorized investigation.”60 But the specifics of how 
the FISC interpreted section 215 were kept secret. The provision was scheduled 
to sunset in 2010 and again in 2011, unless Congress voted to reauthorize it.61 
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 215-SUNSET, SUNSET OF SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT OF 
2001, 1 n.4 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/215-sunset.pdf [https://perma.cc/R294-2XCG]. 
Civil society groups took the opportunity to lobby intensively for changes, but 
they were forced to speculate about how the law was being interpreted.62 As it 
turns out, their speculations were way off the mark. Most groups lobbying for 
changes were concerned about the perceived risk that the FBI would use the law 
to target individuals based on their First Amendment protected activities.63 
58. 
59. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). 
60. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
61. 
62. See, e.g., Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. 107–610 (2001) (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center for Democracy and 
Technology). 
63. Reform the Patriot Act—Section 215, ACLU (Oct. 31, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20111031065406/https://www.aclu.org/free-speech-national-security-technology-and-liberty/reform­
This 
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patriot-act-section-215 [https://perma.cc/AX2P-Z6TT] (explaining the PATRIOT Act prohibited investi­
gations conducted “solely” on the basis of First Amendment activity, which civil society groups 
interpreted to mean that “[t]he FBI [could] investigate United States persons based in part on their 
exercise of First Amendment rights”). 
concern led groups to focus on the use of section 215 to obtain library 
records—a powerful example of records cloaked by First Amendment inter­
ests.64 
See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RECLAIMING PATRIOTISM: A CALL TO RECONSIDER THE PATRIOT 
ACT 18–20 (2009), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/patriot_report_20090310.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6DQ-8XDE]. 
Indeed, section 215 came to be known as the “library records” provision.65 
See Andrew C. McCarthy, Why Sections 214 and 215 Should Be Retained, PATRIOT DEBATES 
(2005), https://apps.americanbar.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/214-and-215-2#opening [https://perma. 
cc/6LC6-FX5H]; see also Justin Elliott, Remember When the Patriot Act Debate Was All About Library 
Records?, PROPUBLICA (June 17, 2013, 2:08 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/remember-when-the­
patriot-act-debate-was-about-library-records [https://perma.cc/4FLM-4EC8]. 
Asked about these lobbying efforts after the Snowden disclosures revealed 
the true scope of section 215 surveillance, Lee Tien, a civil liberties lawyer at 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, explained “[p]eople could see that those 
kinds of records were very seriously connected to First Amendment activity and 
the librarians were going to war on it.”66 Indeed, at that point the only public 
evidence of abuse of section 215 involved FBI circumvention of the section’s 
limited protection for First Amendment activity.67 
A 2008 Inspector General report indicated that when the FISC twice denied section 215 
applications citing First Amendment concerns, the FBI persisted in the investigation and issued 
National Security Letters instead, which do not require any court approval or oversight. See OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR 
BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006 5, 65–74 (2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0803a/final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/78FW-GHY6]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 64, at 18–19 (focusing on this and 
related concerns with section 215). 
It is hard to imagine a more misguided lobbying effort. As Tien reflected, “A 
person might uncharitably think of us as lacking in imagination . . . .”68 But it is 
difficult to blame anyone for failing to imagine that section 215 had been 
interpreted to permit the indiscriminate mass collection of all domestic tele­
phone records by the NSA (and that a parallel provision of law had been 
interpreted to permit mass collection of Internet records). Yet the law had been 
used in that way at least as far back as 2006, four years before it first came up 
for reauthorization.69 
64. 
65. 
66. Elliott, supra note 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67. 
68. Elliot, supra note 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69. That the NSA was collecting domestic calling records was reported by USA Today as far back as 
2006, but at that point the program was based on the voluntary cooperation of telephone companies 
turning over their call detail records, not any secret interpretation of law. See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has 
Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY (May 11, 2006, 10:38 AM), http://usatoday30. 
usatoday.com/news/Washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm [https://perma.cc/P4QA-9J4Y]. After these re­
ports came to light, the phone companies stopped providing the records voluntarily and insisted that the 
government obtain a court order, prompting the government to obtain such a court order from the FISC 
under an aggressive (and secret) interpretation of section 215. See Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance 
Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-surveillance-architecture-includes-collection-of­
revealing-internet-phone-metadata/2013/06/15/e9bf004a-d511-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html 
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[https://perma.cc/3D93-GB2R]. It was not until the Snowden disclosures that the public learned section 
215 had been interpreted to authorize bulk collection in this way. See id. 
This interpretation was not a truly “deep secret”70—everyone understood that 
there was uncertainty about how section 215 would be applied by the FBI and 
interpreted by the FISC.71 But even the shallow secrecy about the FISC’s 
interpretation meant that years of lobbying efforts were almost completely 
beside the point. 
This kind of democratic oversight is important—not just to ensure that the 
public can have its say, but also to improve the law itself. Where deliberation is 
cloistered within certain parts of the Executive Branch and Congress or a small 
number of judges, there is far less opportunity for expert criticism and moral 
deliberation. By contrast, when the public is in the loop, it is possible for subject 
matter experts, opinion leaders, and deep thinkers of various stripes to shape the 
law to improve it, or at least to shed light on its likely benefits and drawbacks.72 
Again, the section 215 example illustrates the point. Immediately after the 
Snowden disclosures, technologists and computer scientists began to explain the 
implications and pitfalls of the bulk phone collection program. They showed, 
for example, that the rules governing the program meant that intelligence 
analysts could probably review the calling histories of millions of Americans, 
even though only a few thousand phone numbers had been tagged with reason­
able suspicion.73 
See, e.g., Sean Gallagher, You May Already Be a Winner in NSA’s “Three-Degrees” Surveillance 
Sweepstakes!, ARS TECHNICA (July 18, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/ 
2013/07/you-may-already-be-a-winner-in-nsas-three-degrees-surveillance-sweepstakes [https://perma.cc/ 
8QX5-EFRM]. 
Others explained and demonstrated how metadata analysis of 
calling records could reveal a great variety of personal, highly confidential 
information using simple analytic tools, even without combining it with other 
sources of information likely available to the government.74 
70. I follow the terminology used by David Pozen. See Pozen, supra note 21, at 267. As Pozen 
explains, the “depth” of a secret depends on how many people know of the secret, whether those people 
are spread across multiple institutions or branches of government, how much they know, and how 
quickly they find out. See id. 
71. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 64, at 32. 
72. Peter Shane makes a similar point, arguing that the lack of scrutiny that results from secrecy can 
lead to poor decision making, particularly with respect to advice from Executive Branch lawyers. Peter 
M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for Conscientious Legal 
Analysis, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 507, 508 (2012). 
73. 
74. See, e.g., Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten ¶ 24, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (ECF No. 27); Matt Blaze, Opinion, Phew, NSA Is Just Collecting 
Metadata. (You Should Still Worry), WIRED (June 19, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/06/ 
phew-it-was-just-metadata-not-think-again [https://perma.cc/WC2E-F7QC]; Matthew Harwood, My Life 
in Circles: Why Metadata Is Incredibly Intimate, ACLU (July 29, 2013, 3:19 PM), https://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/my-life-circles-why-metadata-incredibly-intimate [https:// 
perma.cc/K7Z5-HA5V]; Mike Masnick, Anyone Brushing Off NSA Surveillance Because It’s ‘Just 
Metadata’ Doesn’t Know What Metadata Is, TECHDIRT (July 8, 2013, 11:24 AM), https://www.techdirt. 
com/articles/20130708/01453123733/anyone-brushing-off-nsa-surveillance-because-its-just-metadata­
doesnt-know-what-metadata-is.shtm [https://perma.cc/MS6L-DUXU]; Kurt Opsahl, Why Metadata 
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Matters, EFF DEEPLINKS BLOG (June 7, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/why-metadata­
matters [https://perma.cc/6VTY-ZTKF]. 
Lawyers, for their part, quickly began raising Fourth Amendment concerns 
that the FISC had apparently never considered. For instance, they pointed out 
that in the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones,75 five 
concurring Justices joined opinions suggesting that Fourth Amendment protec­
tions might be triggered by certain kinds of pervasive data collection about 
individuals even if smaller scale collection of the same type of information 
would raise no constitutional concerns.76 
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Jim Harper, Why NSA’s Bulk Data Seizures Are Illegal and 
Unconstitutional, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/why-nsas­
bulk-data-seizures-are-illegal-and-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/XRU7-AQZN] (explaining United 
States v. Jones undermined the constitutional basis for the section 215 program in a number of ways); 
Jonathan Hafetz, Bulk Data Collection and the Mosaic Theory: A More Balanced Approach to 
Information, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 17, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/5758/guest-post-bulk-data­
collection-mosaic-theory [https://perma.cc/857J-JK8N]. 
In response to this input from outside experts, the Obama Administration 
announced significant reforms to the section 215 program,77 
See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y., Statement by the President on the Section 215 Bulk 
Metadata Program (Mar. 27, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/ 
statement-president-section-215-bulk-metadata-program [https://perma.cc/9FY7-TXPP]. 
Congress passed 
legislation to narrow the law and improve it,78 and one circuit court held that 
the program—as it had been run pre-Snowden—was illegal.79 None of this 
progress would have been possible had the secret interpretation of section 215 
remained hidden from the public. 
In short, secret law short-circuits ordinary democratic checks on lawmaking. 
In practice, this means that public pressure that would otherwise lead to changes 
and improvements in the law will be absent or misdirected. In extreme cases— 
particularly where the public does not even know about the existence of the law 
or where Congress is kept in the dark—secret lawmaking can amount to a kind 
of oligarchy: lawmaking entrusted to an elite few who need not be concerned 
about the public’s views regarding the governing rules they enact.80 
3. Undermining the Separation of Powers 
Secret law also interferes with the ability of the branches of government to 
play their respective roles in a system of checked powers. Most notably, where 
the law is secret, Congress’s ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities with 
respect to the Executive Branch are greatly diminished, and the courts will often 
be cut out of the equation completely because no litigant will be able to bring a 
75. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
76. 
77. 
78. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015). 
79. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015). 
80. Legal philosopher Christopher Kutz makes a similar point regarding the illegitimacy of secret 
law: “[S]ecret law deprives the governor of his legitimacy, undermining his right to rule. This is 
because the claim to rule is a claim founded in law—not as a matter of constitutional pedigree, but as a 
distinctive form of governance, with aspirations beyond mere thuggish control.” Christopher Kutz, 
Secret Law and the Value of Publicity, 22 RATIO JURIS 197, 212 (2009). 
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justiciable case. Secrecy thus undermines external checks on the conduct of the 
Executive Branch in the national security sphere, which, in turn, limits opportu­
nities for external reinforcement of internal constraints within the Executive 
Branch.81 I explain and illustrate each problem in turn. 
Both of the principal functions of Congress—to make laws and oversee their 
implementation by the Executive—are impeded when the law is kept secret 
from the public. The most obvious problems occur when the law is not only 
kept from the public, but is only shared with a few select members of Congress. 
Members of Congress are hamstrung when they are not permitted to freely 
share information with all of their colleagues or the public: they cannot hold 
public hearings, they cannot issue public subpoenas, and they cannot make 
speeches because all of these activities would involve disseminating classified 
information.82 Instead, members of Congress are relegated to working an inside 
game, attempting to expand the circle of legislators privy to the secret law in 
hopes of rallying efforts to engage in effective oversight or legislative efforts.83 
As Professor Heidi Kitrosser has detailed, the rules governing the handling of classified 
information in Congress do not give individual members of Congress the power to decide to disclose 
information to colleagues. Instead, decisions about disseminating such information are entrusted to the 
Executive, or else put to a vote of the relevant committees. See id. at 1080. Each house reserves the 
right to make classified information public upon a majority vote of an entire house, but it does not 
appear that this mechanism has been invoked even once. See id. at 1081–83; see also DENIS MC­
DONOUGH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NO MERE OVERSIGHT: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLI­
GENCE IS BROKEN 27 (2006), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/kf/ nomereoversight 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6GX-SNR2]. 
But even when every member of Congress has access to a secret law, 
Congress’s ability to discharge its oversight and legislative functions will be 
greatly diminished for a number of reasons. Where the law is secret, it is 
extraordinarily difficult to mount a legislative campaign to amend the law.84 It is 
particularly difficult to muster legislative support, often in the face of executive 
opposition, to fix a problem that the public does not even know about. There are 
few rewards for a member of Congress to support such an initiative. Members 
with strong principled objections to the secret law may propose amendments, 
but in the absence of any public pressure to act others will prefer to abide the 
status quo. 
These difficulties are compounded by the strict restrictions members of 
Congress face in reviewing, discussing, and sharing classified information. It 
appears that congressional access to secret law is typically accomplished by an 
opt-in system: members must go out of their way to review the secret materials 
81. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separa­
tion of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 437–47 (2009) (arguing that external checks and balances reinforce 
internal constraints on executive power). 
82. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improv­
ing Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2008). 
83. 
84. See supra notes 59–71 and accompanying text (discussing the failed legislative campaign to 
reform section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act prior to the Snowden disclosures about how broadly that 
provision had been interpreted). 
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in a specified secure facility after undertaking the necessary oaths and other 
formalities.85 Thus, many of one’s colleagues in Congress may not even be 
“read in” to the secret law. Still worse, expert staff members and legal counsel 
may not be cleared to see the information, severely hampering all but the most 
diligent and expert members of Congress.86 
See Andrea Peterson, Obama Says NSA Has Plenty of Congressional Oversight. But One 
Congressman Says It’s a Farce, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the­
switch/wp/2013/10/09/obama-says-nsa-has-plenty-of-congressional-oversight-but-one-congressman-says­
its-a-farce [https://perma.cc/64BE-8X2K] (“[Rep.] Amash also noted that the release he had to sign to 
view classified documents prohibited him from discussing them with anyone—including other mem­
bers of Congress who all have clearance to discuss them.”). 
The result of all these restrictions is that any congressional deliberation will 
be stilted and cumbersome. And even if, despite these restrictions, there is a 
movement within Congress to conduct oversight, it can happen only in closed 
sessions, which are much less effective than open sessions precisely because 
they lack the power to focus public attention on an issue and trigger outside 
groups to engage with it. 
The example of section 215 illustrates all of these difficulties. By the time the 
PATRIOT Act was scheduled to sunset in 2011, the DOJ appeared to have made 
available to members of Congress its secret interpretation of the law, which had 
by then been endorsed by the FISC. But few members of Congress learned that 
the law was in fact being interpreted to permit bulk collection of essentially all 
domestic telephone records because this information was strictly controlled and 
restricted.87 Indeed, one of the original sponsors of the PATRIOT Act, Represen­
tative Jim Sensenbrenner, has since related that he would not have voted to 
reauthorize the law in 2011 had he known how it was being applied.88 
See id.; Jim Sensenbrenner, Opinion, How Obama Has Abused the Patriot Act, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 
19, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/19/opinion/la-oe-sensenbrenner-data-patriot-act-obama­
20130819 [https://perma.cc/M4XQ-VRYB]. 
Secrecy also stymied the small handful of legislators who began sounding the 
alarm about section 215 early. One senator went so far as to propose amend­
ments that would have required disclosure of significant secret interpretations of 
section 215.89 But those senators were unable to make a proper public case for 
their amendment. Instead, to avoid divulging classified law, they were forced to 
resort only to ambiguous hypotheticals about how the current law might permit 
abuses.90 
See 158 CONG. REC. S8,398–407 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2012); Declan McCullagh, Patriot Act 
Renewed Despite Warnings of ‘Secret’ Law, CNET (May 28, 2011, 6:08 AM PDT), http://www.cnet.com/ 
news/patriot-act-renewed-despite-warnings-of-secret-law [https://perma.cc/KE33-N75K]. 
Unsurprisingly, relatively few members of Congress were moved to 
vote in favor of the proposed amendments.91 
85. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20748, PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMA­
TION BY CONGRESS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS 1–3 (2011) (describing restrictions on access to classified 
information by members of Congress). 
86. 
87. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 820 (2d Cir. 2015). 
88. 
89. See 158 CONG. REC. S8,397–98 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley). 
90. 
91. 158 CONG. REC. S8,427–28 (daily ed. Dec. 27, 2012) (recording votes on Senate Amendment 
3435 regarding public disclosure of significant FISC opinions, which failed 37–54). 
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By contrast, once the secret interpretations of section 215 were made public 
by Snowden—and members of Congress were made to feel the weight of public 
opinion—similar amendments were passed into law with a bipartisan major­
ity.92 Until the secret law of section 215 became public, Congress was unable to 
act as an effective check on the Executive Branch; once the law was public, 
Congress was able to discharge its role. 
Secret law also impedes the ability of the courts to function as an indepen­
dent check on the lawfulness of executive action. It does so for a simple reason: 
if the law governing a program is secret, it will often be impossible to develop 
cases to challenge the program. Even when lawyers do manage to bring cases to 
court, secret law creates numerous obstacles to obtaining a decision on the 
merits. 
This was illustrated most starkly by Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, in  
which a group of lawyers, journalists, and human rights researchers brought suit 
to challenge foreign electronic surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act 
because the law forced them to take costly measures to avoid the likelihood that 
their confidential communications would be intercepted.93 The Supreme Court 
dismissed the case for lack of standing because the plaintiffs did not know to a 
certainty that their communications had been surveilled, and so, in the Court’s 
view, could not prove an injury sufficient to establish their standing.94 
Even in cases where plaintiffs can establish standing, the state secrets privi­
lege will often stand as an obstacle to adjudication.95 For instance, in response 
to a lawsuit challenging the legality of the planned targeted killing of a citizen, 
the government argued that the case could not be litigated because essential 
facts about the program—including the detailed legal rationale96—were state 
secrets. Although that case was ultimately dismissed on other grounds (the 
political question doctrine and standing), the state secrets privilege stood as an 
additional obstacle to adjudication had those two grounds been overcome.97 
92. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015). 
93. 568 U.S. 398, 401–02 (2013). 
94. Id. 
95. See generally Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 77 (2010) 
(documenting how the state secrets privilege has evolved from an evidentiary privilege into a tool to 
prevent cases from proceeding to the merits). 
96. See Public Declaration and Assertion of Military and State Secrets Privilege by Robert M. Gates, 
Secretary of Defense ¶ 5(B), Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), ECF No. 15-5 
(asserting state secrets privilege over “criteria or procedures DoD may utilize in connection with such 
military operations”); Declaration and Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege and Statutory Privileges 
by Leon E. Panetta, Director, Central Intelligence Agency ¶ 3, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2010), ECF No. 15-6. 
97. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. at 53. Steve Vladeck and Andy Wright question whether greater 
transparency would lead to better oversight given the myriad obstacles that have been placed in the way 
of plaintiffs seeking to challenge national security programs. See Steve Vladeck & Andy Wright, Why 
(Some) Secrecy is Good for Civil Liberties, JUST SECURITY (July 25, 2014, 8:18 AM), http://justsecurity. 
org/13189/secrecy-civil-liberties [https://perma.cc/94JN-KHH8]. But secrecy stands as an additional 
obstacle, and would often preclude litigation even if other threshold obstacles were eliminated. 
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To be sure, that a law is secret does not always preclude a court’s involve­
ment, but it does mean that certain aspects of the adjudication will almost 
always be conducted in secret, usually ex parte, with participation only by the 
government. This has been the typical practice in the FISC.98 
See FISA CT. R. P. 7(j), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FISC%20Rules%20of% 
20Procedure.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P6D-GHKD]; Ben Cook, Note, The New FISA Court Amicus 
Should Be Able To Ignore Its Congressionally Imposed Duty, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 539, 551–65 (2016) 
(detailing the limited role of adversarial proceedings in the FISC and the evolution thereof). 
But ordinary 
Article III courts have contemplated secret procedures, too.99 Adjudication in 
such circumstances is fraught with familiar practical difficulties that are only 
heightened in the national security context: courts operating ex parte cannot 
have full adversarial argument or benefit from helpful public scrutiny and expert 
participation.100 
I do not mean to argue here that there can be no checks and balances where 
the law is secret. At least where the law is not a “deep secret”—in other words, 
the existence of a law is not itself secret, utterly unknown to coordinate 
branches of government101—there may be opportunities for some interbranch 
contestation outside of public view.102 But, as I have argued, such external 
constraints will be severely compromised when public scrutiny is cut out of the 
equation. 
Moreover, a number of scholars have argued that checks and balances 
internal to the Executive Branch can serve as constraints on the exercise of 
executive power.103 
See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Danger­
ous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (encouraging debate within the Executive Branch 
as a means of internal checks and balances); M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure Substance? A 
Response to Neal Katyal’s Internal Separation of Powers, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 125 (2006), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/can-process-cure-substance-a-response-to-neal-katyala8217s-a8220inte 
rnal-separation-of-powersa8221 [http://perma.cc/7BBD-8DDL] (discussing internal dissent within the 
Executive Branch that led to substantive policy reform); Metzger, supra note 81 (discussing the efficacy 
of internal and external checks and balances); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of 
Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015) (explaining the impact of internal checks on the modern state 
of separation of powers). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (discussing the effects of internal checks, among other things, on 
executive action in the aftermath of 9/11). 
There are difficult questions about whether internal adminis­
98. 
99. See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142 (D. Or. 2014) (“The government may 
provide to the court ex parte and in camera information that is part of the administrative record and that 
the government has determined is classified, Sensitive Security Information, law-enforcement investiga­
tive information, and/or information otherwise privileged or protected from disclosure by statute or 
regulation.”). 
100. Cf. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060–61 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The openness of judicial 
proceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the reality of fairness in the adjudications of 
United States courts.”). 
101. The term “deep secrets” is drawn from David Pozen, who explores the nature and consequences 
of secrets that are so deep that their existence is a tightly held secret known only to a small group of 
officials. See Pozen, supra note 21, at 257, 260–65. Pozen’s notion of a deep secret in turn draws on the 
work of Kim Lane Scheppele. See id. at 262; see also KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY 
AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 21–22, 75–79, 84–85 (1988). 
102. See infra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
103. 
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trative constraints can effectively replicate interbranch contestation, particularly 
in the face of determined presidential action in the national security context.104 
But even setting aside those general concerns, internal checks on executive 
power are less likely to have bite when it comes to secret law. As Gillian 
Metzger has argued, internal constraints within the administration depend on 
external constraints for their vitality.105 Officials within the Executive Branch— 
particularly those charged with developing rules and legal interpretations—will 
act more carefully and deliberately when they know that the public and other 
branches of government are likely to check their work.106 Where the Govern­
ment adopts rules not made public, external constraints will be weakened and 
internal constraints will likewise suffer. 
B. THE REASONS FOR SECRET LAW 
Although secret law poses serious threats to principles of individual liberty, 
democracy, accountability, and checks and balances, the government has never­
theless argued vigorously for the importance of keeping various laws secret. It 
is necessary to take seriously the reasons that motivate the practice of secret 
law. Four key rationales have been offered: maintaining the secrecy of a 
government program, avoiding circumvention of a government program, protect­
ing a government program from being dismantled by misguided public opinion, 
and protecting the ability of government to freely deliberate in private. I discuss 
each in turn. 
1. Keeping Secret Programs Secret 
First and foremost, secret law has been justified by appeal to the need to keep 
certain government activities secret. The concern is that disclosure of the rules 
that regulate a government activity will tend to reveal details about the program 
itself, so that if there is good reason to keep the latter secret then the former 
must be kept secret, too. Courts have endorsed this rationale, holding that legal 
rules governing a classified program may be properly withheld on the grounds 
that the rules themselves would reveal information—such as intelligence 
methods—protected by statute.107 
104. See, e.g., Magill, supra note 103; Metzger, supra note 81, at 441–42. 
105. See Metzger, supra note 81, at 442–47. 
106. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive 
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1596–600 (2007) (“Perhaps most essential to avoiding a culture in 
which OLC becomes merely an advocate of the administration’s policy preferences is transparency in 
the specific legal advice that informs executive action, as well as in the general governing processes and 
standards.”); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 676, 703, 749–51 (2005) (“The more the public understands what is at stake in executive 
constitutionalism, the more pressure it can bring to bear on the executive to do it fully and well.”). 
107. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 584 F. Supp. 2d 65, 71, 73–74 
(D.D.C. 2008) (explaining government may withhold legal opinions regarding Presidential Surveillance 
Program, even though program was no longer in operation, because to do otherwise would reveal 
classified information about methods of intelligence gathering); see also infra notes 240–43 and 
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This argument may have significant force where it applies, but on close 
inspection it applies much more narrowly than it might appear. This is for three 
reasons. First, the fact that a secret law relates to a secret program does not 
imply that disclosure of the secret rules would disclose the sensitive parts of the 
program. For instance, in the foreign surveillance context pre-Snowden, the 
government consistently refused to disclose the rules that governed how it must 
treat the communications of U.S. persons collected in the course of targeting 
foreigners.108 
These minimization rules were first made public by The Guardian as a result of the Snowden 
disclosures. See Glenn Greenwald & James Ball, The Top Secret Rules That Allow NSA to Use U.S. 
Data Without a Warrant, GUARDIAN (June 20, 2013, 6:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant [https://perma.cc/T548-PF9W]. The government subsequently de­
classified and released the minimization rules. See Press Release, James R. Clapper, supra note 12. 
But keeping such rules—known as “minimization” rules—secret 
did not serve to protect the secrecy of the surveillance capabilities or activities 
of the government, but mostly to obscure the protections afforded to U.S. 
persons caught up in such collection activities.109 It was therefore arguably 
unnecessary to keep the minimization rules secret to protect the sensitive 
aspects of the program.110 Prompted by the Snowden disclosures, the govern­
ment has now released the rules with certain redactions. 
Second, laws relating to a secret program typically reveal sensitive informa­
tion about the program only if the laws are highly specific and granular. More 
general statements of law can often be disclosed without revealing secret 
operational details.111 The example of foreign surveillance again offers a useful 
illustration. Merely disclosing the government’s interpretation of the surveil­
lance authorities need not reveal any operational details about the capacities of 
the agency to intercept or analyze information or about who is targeted, how 
they are targeted, or how often. Disclosure of laws at this intermediate level of 
granularity need only reveal the permissible scope of collection. It is only when 
one steps down a level of granularity—to, say, determinations about the lawful­
ness of targeting a specific group of individuals or rules governing how to 
deploy or install particular collection tools—that disclosing government rules 
accompanying text (collecting cases where the courts have permitted law to be withheld in response to 
FOIA requests). 
108. 
109. The government previously withheld the minimization rules as classified on the grounds that 
their disclosure would reveal intelligence sources, methods, and capabilities that are properly secret. 
See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Office of Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, No. 10-cv-4419, 2012 WL 
1117114, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (upholding agency determination to withhold records under 
Exemption 1). Although these minimization rules relate to intelligence collection, they do not reveal 
anything about those intelligence activities per se—for example, who is being targeted, what kinds of 
communications the government is able to access, how the government collects the information, or how 
much information is collected. Instead, the minimization rules disclose only what the government may 
do with U.S. persons’ information after it has been acquired. 
110. One might make the argument that disclosing the limits on how the government may use 
information it has collected about U.S. persons could permit a nefarious actor to game those rules to its 
advantage. This concern—that disclosure of the rules could permit circumvention of government 
efforts—is discussed in the next section. See infra Section II.B.2. 
111. See infra Section III.C (discussing varying granularity of secret laws). 
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reveals operational details. These more granular directives threaten to disclose 
operational details that might legitimately require secrecy. By contrast, the less 
granular law merely describes the legal limits within which the intelligence 
agencies operate and discloses far less sensitive information about the govern­
ment’s activities.112 
In the wake of the Snowden disclosures, the government has responded by disclosing previ­
ously secret law that precisely straddles these levels of granularity. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, 
No. [REDACTED], at 29–30 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.) (disclosing details about the legal 
scope of permissible surveillance while redacting information about who is targeted, among other 
operational details); Press Release, Shawn Turner, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l 
Intelligence, DNI Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Sec­
tion 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Aug. 21, 2013), http://icontherecord.tumblr. 
com/post/58944252298/dni-declassifies-intelligence-community-documents [https://perma.cc/7EN7­
72HY] (officially disclosing the opinion above). 
Finally, the argument that law must be secret to keep government activities 
secret only works if the activities in question are, in fact, secret. If it is public 
knowledge that the government engages in a given practice, withholding the 
law governing that practice does not serve the stated purpose. The government’s 
previously secret rules regarding targeted killing offer an illustration. The 
government argued for years that its authoritative legal opinions on the issue 
could not be disclosed because they were properly classified.113 All the while, 
that the United States engaged in targeted killings was a secret to nobody. 
Indeed, government officials were willing to discuss the program and particular 
killings both on and off the record.114 
See Cora Currier, How the Gov’t Talks About a Drone Program It Won’t Acknowledge Exists, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 2012, 12:14 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-govt-talks-about-a­
drone-program-it-wont-acknowledge [https://perma.cc/BQC7-5SZ2]; Lena Groeger & Cora Currier, 
Stacking Up the Administration’s Drone Claims, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://projects. 
propublica.org/graphics/cia-drones-strikes [https://perma.cc/TYE4-V9DA] (collecting hundreds of pub­
lic statements by government officials regarding drone strikes). 
In these circumstances, keeping the 
detailed legal rationale secret did not serve any interest in keeping the underly­
ing activity secret.115 Instead, the government’s insistence on secrecy appeared 
to be motivated by a desire to preserve its ability to resist further disclosure in 
court—or, more charitably, to preserve the fiction that the United States was not 
behind the targeted killings because official acknowledgment would put foreign 
governments that acquiesced in the strikes in an awkward position. But these 
rationales neither required nor justified keeping the law itself a secret.116 
112. 
113. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Central Intelligence Agency, 109 F. Supp. 3d 220, 225 
(D.D.C. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 640 F. App’x 9, 
11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (permitting the government to continue to withhold certain legal 
memoranda regarding drone strikes nearly six years after litigation seeking disclosure commenced). 
114. 
115. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 113–15 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding the 
cumulative effect of official government statements regarding targeted killings waived claims to 
secrecy over a particular OLC memo). 
116. See Jack Goldsmith, Release the al-Aulaqi OLC Opinion, or Its Reasoning, LAWFARE (Oct. 3, 
2011, 7:45 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/release-the-al-aulaqi-olc-opinion-or-its-reasoning 
[https://perma.cc/C3RX-UXQ4]. 
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For these three reasons, the notion that law must be kept secret to protect 
secret operations can be overblown. There may still be circumstances where the 
argument is sound; these constitute the hard cases, and I discuss how to deal 
with them in the next few Parts. 
2. Secrecy to Prevent Circumvention or Increase Effectiveness 
Closely related to the first rationale for secret law—keeping programs 
secret—is the notion that secret law is justified to avoid circumvention by bad 
actors117 
See Brian H. Bix, Secrecy and the Nature of Law 5–6 (Oct. 21, 2013) (unpublished manu­
script), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/2418-bixsecrecy-and-the-nature-of-law-full [https://perma. 
cc/9NZL-EMTF]. 
or because disclosure of the secret rules would make the government 
program less effective.118 Paradigm examples of such laws include internal 
protocols used by prosecutors in deciding whether to bring charges and internal 
guidance about how the IRS decides who to audit. In both instances, the 
concern is that a person who knows the rules by which the government plays 
could use that knowledge to evade investigation or prosecution to the detriment 
of the public’s interest in enforcing the law. Similar concerns motivate the 
secrecy of rules governing the conduct of many national security programs, 
including surveillance119 and other national security investigatory techniques,120 
watchlisting,121 and targeted killing.122 Where the government operates accord­
ing to detailed rules that could conceivably be avoided by a bad actor to the 
detriment of the government’s objective, there may be an interest in keeping the 
rules secret. 
The concern may be real, but the argument that it can justify secret law 
proves too much. In any given area of governmental activity, disclosing the 
applicable rules might create some opportunity for circumvention or at least 
impede the effectiveness of the government’s efforts. But this alone cannot 
justify keeping the law secret. For instance, disclosing a police department’s use 
of force policy could conceivably lead bad actors to take measures to evade 
authorities without having force used against them. Yet nearly every law 
117. 
118. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 511 F. Supp. 2d 56, 69 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(quoting declaration of then-OLC director Steven Bradbury) (crediting government’s contention that 
disclosing legal opinions regarding the terms of the warrantless wiretapping program authorized by 
President Bush “would compromise the effectiveness of the Program to the detriment of national 
security” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). 
119. See id. 
120. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Lift the Nondisclosure 
Requirement as to the Attachment to the National Security Letter at 5–6, Doe v. Holder, 703 F. Supp. 2d 
313 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (arguing that permitting disclosure of the types of information the FBI can seek 
pursuant to a national security letter would impede effectiveness of national security investigations). 
121. Cf. Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1154 (D. Or. 2014). 
122. See Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 56, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 
10-cv-1469). 
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enforcement organization in the country discloses such policies.123 
See Use of Force Policy Database, POLICE USE OF FORCE PROJECT, http://useofforceproject.org/ 
database [https://perma.cc/9X5C-FFM7] (compiling use of force policies for the 100 largest U.S. city 
policy departments). 
To take 
another example, disclosing that customs officers at the border are authorized to 
copy the contents of hard drives at will may lead bad actors to avoid carrying 
laptops across the border. But the government cannot seek to avoid such 
circumvention by keeping this legal authority secret.124 
Whether and when the anti-circumvention rationale can justify secrecy regard­
ing the scope of the government’s authority is a question I hope to explore more 
fully in further work. But at a minimum, the anti-circumvention rationale will 
only have bite if the government activity in question is particularly liable to 
circumvention and if the harms of circumvention go beyond merely making the 
government’s investigatory or other functions incrementally more difficult and 
instead somehow undermine its ability to carry out a legitimate function at all. It 
must also be the case that knowing the secret laws in question would, in fact, 
facilitate circumvention. This will more likely be the case where the secret law 
in question is disclosed in granular detail. 
With respect to use of force policies and border searches, none of these 
criteria weigh in favor of secrecy. The calculus may be different for other 
programs. But this determination is essentially case-by-case, and the strength of 
the anti-circumvention rationale will vary accordingly. 
In short, arguments that arise from the mere possibility of circumvention 
alone say little about the nature of the harms that may result from disclosure. 
And even where there are legitimate concerns regarding circumvention, it 
remains necessary to weigh the benefits of preventing circumvention against the 
significant costs of keeping the government’s internal decision rules secret.125 
3. Paternalistic Lawmaking 
Philosopher Duncan MacIntosh has argued that law may be kept secret not 
just to prevent bad actors from subverting it, but also to prevent a well-
intentioned but misguided public from “destroying” laws that are, in fact, in the 
public’s interest, even if unpopular.126 
123. 
124. Indeed, several courts have adjudicated whether border searches are legal and, in the process, 
they have established public legal rules governing such searches. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 
F.3d 1003, 1008–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting out Fourth Amendment standards that generally permit 
suspicionless searches of a laptop at the border, with two narrow exceptions); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 
501, 505–06 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that border searches can be conducted without suspicion). 
125. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 27, at 665–67, 673–74 (explaining that the legitimacy of transmit­
ting internal government rules hidden from public view requires “evaluating competing substantive 
moral considerations”). 
126. See Duncan MacIntosh, Logically Private Laws 2 (Oct. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/2453-macintoshlogically-private-laws-full [https://perma.cc/H6J8­
5DDR]. 
This is a concededly paternalistic argu­
ment, resting on the presumption that elite insiders understand better than the 
public itself what is in the public’s interest. The argument is so discordant with 
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common democratic assumptions that it has rarely been publicly advanced by 
the government,127 but it nevertheless may underlie efforts to keep the law 
secret. Particularly in areas like national security, where the government has 
special access to information about the nature of the problems, a unique 
responsibility to address them, and a special expertise and capacity to deal with 
them, there may be a great temptation—perhaps even a sense of obligation—for 
government officials to pursue their vision of the public interest even if they 
understand that it would meet a tempest of political opposition if it became 
public. But the dangers of such a course are obvious. Who gets to decide 
whether, in a particular case, the paternalistic judgments of insiders can override 
the likely will of the people? And what are the limits on such undemocratic 
exercises of authority? 
Some have defended a vision of the Executive Branch in which officials 
simply exercise power as they deem necessary in times of emergency, uncon­
strained by rules or laws.128 This “Schmittian” view of administrative gover­
nance is one of essentially unfettered executive discretion.129 But on this 
vision—whatever its merits—the problem is not that the law governing the 
Executive is being kept secret; it is that there is no law at all. The kind of 
paternalism demanded by a Schmittian Executive is paternalism not about what 
rules should guide government, but about what a government unconstrained by 
rules should do. 
The problem of secret law, by contrast, only arises where the government has 
chosen to bind itself to rules or is forced to do so by coordinate branches of 
government or other forces. And, as it stands, the contemporary national 
security state is not devoid of rules at all. The examples of surveillance, targeted 
killings, and watchlisting make the point: Each program is regulated by detailed 
internal guidance, legal opinions, and directives. Given that these laws exist, the 
question is whether officials may keep them secret on the basis that those 
officials would prefer to shield them from encountering a public they expect 
would be hostile. 
127. A version of the argument has sometimes been invoked to justify keeping certain judicial 
decisions secret. The idea is that a redacted (or summarized) judicial decision adjudicating mostly 
classified subject matter is more likely to confuse the public than illuminate it. See, e.g., In re Orders of 
this Court Interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, No. Misc. 13–02, 2014 WL 5442058, at *5 
(FISA Ct. Aug. 7, 2014) (considering this argument but finding it inapplicable); In re Motion for 
Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 495 (FISA Ct. 2007) (“The benefits from a partial 
release of declassified portions of the requested materials would be diminished, insofar as release with 
redactions may confuse or obscure, rather than illuminate, the decisions in question.”). 
128. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 
(2009) (arguing that contemporary administrative law contains various legal doctrines that create 
domains in which the Executive Branch is free from legal constraint). 
129. Compare id. at 1108 (calling the Executive Branch’s power in times of crises “Schmittian” and 
suggesting the Executive will always find loopholes to act without constraint), with Evan J. Criddle, 
Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1271 (2010) (explaining that 
loopholes giving the Executive Branch so much discretion could be closed without compromising an 
agency’s ability to respond in an emergency). 
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If evading public scrutiny for the sake of evading negative public scrutiny is 
an acceptable justification for keeping laws secret, we have travelled a signifi­
cant way down the road away from the consent of the governed and meaningful 
democratic control of government. In any case, the premise of the argument— 
that the public would precipitously and irrationally strip the government of 
important powers—appears to be severely overblown. If anything, the lesson of 
the 9/11 era is that when controversial secret programs eventually become 
public, they will often be ratified and entrenched—perhaps with minor 
modifications—rather than eliminated.130 
Examples abound. Military Commissions established unilaterally by the President, struck down 
as unconstitutional in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590–95 (2006), were subsequently enacted 
by Congress. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.). Revelations about warrantless 
spying carried out by the President and aided by telecommunications companies—all apparently in 
violation of FISA—were followed by an enactment ratifying the President’s surveillance activities and 
giving telecommunications companies retroactive immunity. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008); Protect America Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007); EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34600, 
RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY PROVIDED BY THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 (2008); James Risen, Bush 
Signs Law to Widen Reach for Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
08/06/washington/06nsa.html [https://nyti.ms/2jBuhqu]. One notable exception is the government’s 
practice of torture, which ceased part way through the Bush Administration and was subsequently 
repudiated by the Obama Administration. See S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 58, at 
15–16 (summarizing the demise of the Bush-era torture program); Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 4,893–96 (Jan. 22, 2009) (strictly limiting the interrogation techniques that may be used by U.S. 
agencies). More recently, however, President Trump has openly discussed bringing back torture, 
although the Administration has taken no formal public steps in that direction. See Adam Serwer, Can 
Trump Bring Back Torture?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2017/01/trump-torture/514463 [https://perma.cc/YL52-PRJH]. Congress has now enacted legislative 
reforms regarding NSA bulk collection of domestic calling records, although many NSA surveillance 
programs remain untouched. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 
(2015); David Cole, Reining in the NSA, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (June 2, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www. 
nybooks.com/daily/2015/06/02/nsa-surveillance-congress-sunset [https://perma.cc/7YVN-9MH9]. 
4. Protecting Government Deliberations 
Finally, the government has frequently argued that disclosure of some inter­
nal laws, particularly legal opinions, would impair the deliberative process of 
the government. Opening up such texts to public scrutiny could “chill the ability 
of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch to obtain legal advice,”131 impede candor and 
internal debate, and ultimately threaten the quality of government decisions.132 
Questions about whether internal law should be protected by deliberative 
process have been explored most thoroughly with respect to the opinions of the 
OLC.133 Such opinions are binding on the Executive Branch unless overruled 
130. 
131. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 584 F. Supp. 2d 65, 76 (D.D.C. 2008). 
132. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 35–38, Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 
13-cv-1291). 
133. In addition, the attorney–client privilege is sometimes invoked as a ground to keep authoritative 
legal opinions secret. This argument fails to appreciate the unique function of legal advice by certain 
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by the Attorney General or President, yet they are often unpublished.134 Many 
former officials of the OLC have expressed the view that such opinions should 
presumptively be published, acknowledging that absent special circumstances, 
publishing such opinions would not harm the deliberative process of govern­
ment and might, in fact, improve it.135 
The concern for protecting the deliberative process of government seems 
misdirected in a fundamental way when the question is whether to disclose 
law—the rules and interpretations that government officials regard as binding. 
When one speaks of secret law, one is no longer in the realm of “deliberating” 
over policy, but rather establishing it or carrying it out. To be sure, some legal 
opinions may play an important role in deliberations over all manner of 
government policy, but it cannot harm the integrity of those deliberations to 
disclose their outcomes, including the legal positions and parameters accepted 
as authoritative.136 
In this Part, I have examined the normative terrain on which battles about 
secret law are fought. I have surveyed the considerations that militate against 
secret law and also those that motivate its use. But this broad account of the 
normative concerns about secret law is perhaps too abstracted from the concrete 
details of any particular case to offer guidance as to whether secret law is 
justified. Accordingly, in the next Part, I identify five distinct and independent 
criteria against which a particular instance of secret law can be measured. Each 
of these criteria engages one or more of the broad normative considerations just 
offered. By paying attention to these more concrete measures, it is possible to 
government lawyers. Unlike an attorney advising a private client, legal opinions of Executive Branch 
lawyers can, if regarded as binding statements of law, actually establish the law that the government 
follows—not merely provide guidance about the law. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2012). 
134. See Morrison, supra note 24, 1725. 
135. See, e.g., id. at 1724–26 (arguing that publication of OLC opinions is desirable to permit 
meaningful checks and balances and to motivate OLC lawyers to write opinions that live up to the 
standards of the office); see also Restoring the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 186 (2008) (joint statement of David J. 
Barron, Walter E. Dellinger, Dawn E. Johnsen, Neil J. Kinkopf, Martin S. Lederman, Trevor W. 
Morrison, and Christopher H. Schroeder); Secret Law and the Threat to Democratic and Accountable 
Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 126–27 (2008) [hereinafter Secret Law Hearing] (statement of Dawn E. Johnsen); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 517 (1993); 
Setty, supra note 18, at 601–10. These authors—and OLC itself—have typically identified deliberative 
process concerns as obstacles to disclosure only in narrow circumstances and instead cite the need to 
protect classified information or circumvention of law enforcement as legitimate reasons for withhold­
ing. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 24, at 1725; Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, for Attorneys of the Office 5–6 (July 16, 2010). 
136. In some instances, legal opinions are peppered with information that could reveal the delibera­
tive process of the government. For instance, a legal opinion may include descriptions of rejected 
policy options, the views of various stakeholders, or the internal history of a given proposal. But the 
inclusion of such material cannot be grounds for keeping the legal content in an opinion secret; the 
solution is simply to redact the deliberative material. Even if redaction is not feasible, it will often be 
possible to prepare a legal summary divorced from sensitive facts. 
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identify what is truly in dispute in debates about the legitimacy of secret law 
and what might be done about it. 
III. EVALUATING SECRET LAWS 
Too often, disputes about whether secret law is justified are pitched as a 
simple contest between the government’s interests in secrecy and the public’s 
desire for greater transparency. The dominant metaphor is the zero-sum game: 
less secrecy would come at the expense of an increase in risk to national 
security. 137 In some instances, the question may indeed come down to intrac­
table value contests of this kind. But this picture is too simple. As demonstrated 
in the prior Part, there are multiple competing values at stake in debates over 
secret law. And, as I seek to show in this Part, whether any one of these 
competing norms is engaged depends on the extent to which the secret law 
displays certain characteristics. Specifically, I identify five key characteristics of 
secret laws that are particularly salient when assessing the merits of secrecy. In 
many cases, it will be possible to modulate these characteristics—say, by 
disclosing a more granular account of the secret rules without revealing opera­
tional details—in a way that better accommodates transparency values with 
little increase in national security risk. 
Put simply, secret laws vary. And in what follows, I discuss five key attributes 
that characterize this variation. They are (1) the extent to which a secret law has 
external effects on members of the public, (2) the extent to which the content of 
the secret law is novel or unforeseeable in light of the publicly available laws on 
the books, (3) the level of granularity at which the content of the law is 
disclosed, (4) the likely duration of secrecy—in other words, whether the secret 
law will predictably become public within a certain time frame, and (5) the 
depth of the secret, or how broadly within and across branches of government a 
secret law’s existence or its content have been disseminated. Each of these 
attributes can be understood as defining a continuum. By paying attention to 
where a given instance of secret law lies along these five axes, it may be 
possible to see ways of reducing the tension between normative commitments 
favoring transparency and those that press toward secrecy. At the very least, this 
way of disaggregating the problem of secret law should permit a more nuanced 
understanding of what is really at stake in any particular dispute about whether 
secret laws should be kept secret. 
137. See, e.g., David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L  & POL’Y 
209, 273–75 (2014) (explaining, with respect to the Covert Action statute and FISA laws, that “it might 
be impossible, in many cases, to explain those [legal] interpretations [of the Covert Action statute] 
without revealing the most sensitive classified information” and that for years the Intelligence Commu­
nity “concluded . . .  that the legal interpretation [of FISA permitting bulk collection] was so embedded 
in its factual and operational context that revealing it would harm national security”). 
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A. EXTERNAL EFFECTS 
Disputes about secret law can turn on the extent to which the law in question 
affects the public, as contrasted with a law whose effects are solely internal to 
the government. Although mere housekeeping rules that structure internal gov­
ernment operations will rarely draw criticism when kept secret, internal rules 
that regulate how the government interacts with the public will often raise grave 
concerns.138 Rules attaching penalties or other negative consequences to private 
conduct will be the most controversial.139 Thus, disputes over secret law may 
turn on the degree to which the law in question affects the public. The greater 
and more direct the effects are on the public, the stronger the case against 
secrecy. 
Isolating external effects as an important characteristic of secret law makes 
sense in light of the normative concerns, discussed above, that militate against 
secret law.140 In particular, threats to individual liberty and democratic participa­
tion tend to grow in direct proportion to a secret law’s effects on the public. This 
is because objections to secret law on the grounds of individual liberty are 
strongest where individuals are directly affected by exercises of state power 
according to secret rules. Likewise, democratic concerns are heightened where 
the public is prevented from having a meaningful say about rules that directly 
affect them. 
This dynamic with respect to external effects can be neatly illustrated with an 
example from the context of targeted killings and drone strikes. The legal 
standards and procedures that set out when the government may engage in 
targeted killings are directed internally—to the officials who decide and ulti­
mately carry out the targeted killing—but they also have momentous external 
effects because they set out the circumstances in which a person is liable to be 
killed without process.141 Secrecy in this context arouses strong opposition. By 
contrast, the internal rules governing administrative aspects of the targeted 
killing program—for example, the rules governing maintenance and testing of 
remotely piloted aircraft used to carry out targeted killings142
See Whitney Amstutz, Reaper Maintainers Ensure ISR Mission Accomplishment, U.S. AIR 
FORCE (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/581953/reaper-maintainers­
ensure-isr-mission-accomplishment/. 
—typically have 
fewer, if any, effects outside the government. Even if the two sets of rules were 
equally hidden from the public, the targeting rules would provoke much more 
justifiable opposition than the maintenance rules. This is precisely because only 
138. Secret surveillance laws are a prime example of the latter type. 
139. Examples of secret laws of this type include rules governing the No-Fly list and targeted 
killings. 
140. See supra Section II.A. 
141. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 124–51 (2d Cir. 2014) (Appendix A) 
(setting forth a redacted version of the OLC memo that provided the legal framework governing the 
targeting of a U.S. citizen in Yemen). 
142. 
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the former rules immediately affect the public and, therefore, directly engage 
anti-secrecy values of individual liberty and democratic oversight. 
B. NOVELTY AND FORESEEABILITY 
Another important dimension on which secret laws vary is the extent to 
which they depart from the law available to the public. Put another way, one 
might ask to what extent a member of the public with access only to the laws on 
the books could reasonably foresee the content of the rules or interpretations 
that the government has adopted in secret. Where secret rules depart aggres­
sively from foreseeable interpretations, the public is kept in the dark about what 
the law is and—even more troubling—the public’s ability to rely on the 
published laws is undermined. By adopting aggressive or unforeseeable interpre­
tations in secret, the government creates a smokescreen: the law on the books 
provides a false sense that the public knows what the rules are, what powers the 
government has, and what limits it must obey. 
This mismatch between public expectations and secret reality about the 
content of the law powerfully engages anti-secrecy values of democratic partici­
pation because the public cannot meaningfully engage with secret laws whose 
content is unforeseeable. It also threatens individual liberty because the public 
is kept in the dark as to the scope and limits of government authority. 
Three examples make these points. The revelations in 2005 about President 
Bush’s domestic warrantless surveillance program were so troubling because 
the President and the NSA had issued secret directives and rules that directly 
conflicted with the laws on the books.143 The NSA was operating according to 
rules that nobody could have foreseen based on the public laws in question; in 
fact, it was operating in ways specifically prohibited by the public laws in 
question.144 The mismatch is what made this instance of secret law so shocking. 
The foreseeability problem of secret law was again at the core of the 
Snowden revelations about NSA surveillance. Before the disclosures, Senators 
Ron Wyden and Tom Udall had been sounding the alarm that surveillance laws 
had been interpreted, in secret, in ways that no outsider would recognize.145 
See Charlie Savage, Senators Say Patriot Act Is Being Misinterpreted, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/us/27patriot.html [https//nyti.ms/2nx0ajy]. 
From the Snowden documents we learned that, indeed, the FISC had reinter­
preted section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which only authorized “production of 
[] tangible things” that are “relevant to an authorized investigation,”146 to 
143. See Secret Law Hearing, supra note 135, at 124 (testimony of Dawn E. Johnsen) (noting the 
Bush Administration’s domestic surveillance program did not comply with the requirements of the 
FISA). 
144. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecommc’ns. Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1195–96 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21 (1978)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds sub nom. Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2012). 
145. 
146. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2012). 
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permit mass collection of every American’s telephone records.147 
By contrast, where an agency issues secret interpretations that are merely 
reasonable and foreseeable interpretations of public rules, secret law may not be 
a concern at all. Thus, for instance, there would be little concern if a secret FBI 
rule permitted agents to use National Security Letters (NSLs) to obtain tele­
phone calling records not just for traditional landlines but also for cellphones 
and VoIP phones; a member of the public reading the NSL statute—which 
authorizes demands for “toll billing records”148—would not be surprised to 
learn that the law covers calling records from all types of phones. 
These examples illustrate the general point that secret law becomes more 
problematic—and more difficult to justify—in proportion to the degree by 
which it departs from public laws in ways unforeseeable to the public. 
C. GRANULARITY 
Secret laws vary with respect to the level of granularity at which they have 
been described publicly. This constitutes a third dimension along which secret 
laws can be measured. At the least granular level are descriptions of the broad 
legal principles governing a national security program. For instance, a public 
statement that various surveillance activities “shall be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the [F]ourth [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United 
States” is an extremely general description of the applicable rules.149 Such 
statements reveal little about the specific rules that govern, and so they permit 
little meaningful democratic participation or accountability regarding the sub­
stance of the law. 
At the other end of the spectrum are the most detailed, granular rules for a 
particular program, including the detailed rules that frontline officials must 
follow when running a program, as well as any specific interpretations or 
exceptions to those rules. Disclosing such granular details will alleviate transpar­
ency concerns but is also more likely to reveal the kind of sensitive facts about 
secret programs that the government seeks to protect. It is in this terrain— 
between rules that are uselessly general and revealingly specific—that debates 
over secret law are typically waged. Indeed, many disagreements over the 
propriety of secret law are best understood as disputes about the level of 
granularity at which rules should be disclosed. 
Take, again, the example of the NSL statute described briefly above.150 The 
statute allows the FBI to order electronic service providers to turn over users’ 
“electronic communication transactional records” without first obtaining authori­
zation from a court.151 But “electronic communication transactional records” is 
147. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 815–19 (2d Cir. 2015) (recounting the 
FISC’s interpretation of section 215 and rejecting it as inconsistent with the PATRIOT Act). 
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1) (2012). 
149. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5). 
150. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a). 
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not defined in the statute or in any public rule. Without such disclosure, the 
public only has a general sense of what the statute allows. It is clear, for 
example, that it permits the FBI to obtain information like the “to,” “from,” and 
“date/time” headers in emails. But what about, say, location information col­
lected by GPS-enabled phones?152 
See Jonathan Manes, Online Service Providers and Surveillance Law Transparency, 125 YALE 
L.J. F. 343, 350 (2016), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Manes_PDF_za9rzsda.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PH68-LDCQ]. 
Or a history of searches entered into Google? 
Or a history of websites visited? The FBI has resisted efforts to disclose how it 
interprets the provision, contending that doing so would reveal a law enforce­
ment technique.153 At least one court has pushed back against this secrecy and, 
as a result, we learned that the FBI had secretly interpreted “electronic communi­
cation transactional records” to encompass cell-site location information, which 
can be used to identify the location of a cell phone.154 
See Decision and Order at 19, Merrill v. Lynch, No. 14-cv-9763 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015), 
https://yale.app.box.com/v/nicholas-merrill-sdny-decision [https://perma.cc/94PS-EJ36]. At the time this 
Article was being written, the Supreme Court was considering a case that could clarify the law that 
governs searches for cell-site location information, including whether the Fourth Amendment requires a 
warrant in order to obtain such information. See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017). 
This kind of disagreement is essentially one about the level of granularity at 
which internal rules and interpretations should be made public. Focusing on the 
degree of specificity permits a sharper articulation of the normative dispute 
between secrecy and transparency—in other words, whether disclosure of more 
granular details is warranted in light of the benefits to transparency values and 
any marginal risks of disclosure. 
D. DURATION 
A fourth important characteristic of secret laws is how long the public will be 
kept in the dark. Limiting the length of time a secret law will stay secret serves 
as a mechanism to modulate the tension with transparency values by setting an 
expiration date on secret law. At a minimum, a time limit can ensure that the 
determination of whether secrecy remains necessary will be revisited at regular 
intervals. These kinds of time limits ease concerns about the separation of 
powers and democratic oversight of secret law because they promise that such 
checks and balances will only be postponed, not eliminated. 
Although, in theory, time limits on secrecy can serve as important limits on 
secret law, in practice they are a difficult solution. This is because a secrecy 
determination, once made, carries with it the considerable weight of inertia. If 
disclosure poses any conceivable risk, the status quo is likely to prevail. For this 
reason, expressions of a non-binding commitment to divulge secret law within a 
certain time period tend to founder.155 
152. 
153. See Doe v. Holder, 703 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
154. 
155. The manner in which the law governing NSA surveillance was disclosed provides an example 
of this dynamic. For years prior to the Snowden disclosures, President Obama had signaled that he 
On the other hand, statutory time limits 
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wished to have a broader debate about the scope of intelligence activities. See, e.g., Howard A. 
Schmidt, Protecting Our Values and Cyberspace Together, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 16, 2011, 7:41 
PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/12/16/protecting-our-values-and-cyberspace­
together [https://perma.cc/L6N7-MLC3]. But no disclosures or meaningful public debate were forthcom­
ing. It was only after the Snowden leaks that the government began to declassify its legal opinions and 
directives. See Spencer Ackerman, FISA Judge: Snowden’s NSA Disclosures Triggered Important 
Spying Debate, GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2013, 1:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/13/ 
edward-snowden-nsa-disclosures-judge [https://perma.cc/TG6N-LAWJ]. 
and other decision-forcing mechanisms156 can demand serious consideration 
about whether secrecy remains necessary, requiring officials to make a con­
certed effort if they wish to prolong the status quo.157 The expected duration of 
a secret law thus depends, in part, on the nature of any time limits and how they 
are likely to be enforced. 
E. DEPTH 
Finally, some secret laws are more closely held than others. At the far end of 
the spectrum are laws that are “deep secrets”—instances where the existence of 
the law is closely held to a small group of similarly placed officials.158 At the 
other end of the spectrum are laws that are widely shared across all three 
branches of government and perhaps also with certain security-cleared contrac­
tors or other individuals outside government. 
Secret laws are often less problematic the shallower they are. The deepest 
secrets will be immune even from interbranch oversight, but shallower secrets 
may be amenable to certain checks and balances.159 For instance, disclosing to 
Congress (or to at least some of its members)160 the existence of a secret law 
156. An example of a decision-forcing mechanism is the requirement that prosecutors disclose to 
criminal defendants whether FISA surveillance was used to develop evidence in the government’s case. 
See Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal 
Defendants & The Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 896–97 (2014). 
157. But see generally Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81  
FORDHAM L. REV. 1777 (2013) (arguing that sunset provisions may not be effective at prompting 
reconsideration of national security policies). 
158. See Pozen, supra note 21, at 267–75. 
159. Pozen doubts that secret laws could ever remain particularly deep secrets, given that it is 
typically necessary to involve relatively large numbers of people within the Executive Branch to 
execute a law of any import. See id. at 274 n.51. The experience of the President’s Surveillance 
Program illustrates these secrecy dynamics: at least for some length of time, the program was among 
the deepest secrets of government, known only to a handful of government officials. See PSP REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 14–15. As Pozen predicts, however, the program became a shallower secret as it grew, 
until it was ultimately disclosed to the public by The New York Times (and then partially confirmed by 
the President) approximately four years after it began. See Pozen, supra note 21, at 280–81; see also 
PSP REPORT, supra note 1, at 16–17, 29, 36. 
160. According to statute and interbranch practice, the administration often reveals secret law only 
to a select few members of Congress. See Kitrosser, supra note 82, at 1054–58. This poses oversight 
problems of its own. See id. at 1068–69 (describing the difficulties of meaningful congressional 
oversight in this context). With respect to intelligence matters, the Covert Action statute permits the 
administration to disclose presidential findings only to the so-called “Gang of Eight,” comprising the 
most senior member of each party in the House and Senate and in the Intelligence Committees of each 
house. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(2) (2012). The administration has sometimes chosen to disclose secret 
laws to an even more limited subset of Congress. For instance, the first briefing regarding the 
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means that those members, in theory at least, can begin to agitate for greater 
transparency and oversight.161 By contrast, where the law is known only to 
certain parts of the Executive Branch, there are no opportunities for external 
checks and balances and internal checks will be weakened.162 
* * *  
In this Part, I have sought to define a systematic rubric that assists in 
determining whether secret law is acceptable in any given case, or at least to 
clarify what is in dispute in any given debate over secret law. In the next Part, I 
examine how these disputes are actually resolved in practice and when the law 
permits the Executive Branch to keep the law secret. 
IV. THE LAW OF SECRET LAW 
In this Part, I shift away from normative and evaluative terrain to describe 
how the practice of secret law is actually regulated. This is the “law of secret 
law”—the legal ecosystem that governs whether and when internal law can be 
kept secret from the public. This Part bridges the gap between the normative 
concerns I have already discussed and the reform proposals that follow. By 
examining how the practice of secret law is currently regulated, it will become 
obvious that the existing legal ecosystem sets an equilibrium that produces far 
too much secrecy. It will also become possible to envision a reform agenda that 
could shift the equilibrium away from secrecy. 
The law of secret law consists of a diverse and untidy set of sources. There is 
no single constitutional provision or framework statute that enshrines a prin­
ciple against secret law or prescribes exceptions to such a principle. Instead, 
there is a patchwork of statutes, constitutional provisions, judicial doctrines, and 
legislative–executive practices that together constitute the law of secret law. The 
sources of law include, notably, the Freedom of Information Act (applicable to 
records held by the Executive Branch, except the President and his close 
advisors),163 the Federal Register Act (applicable to the President and other 
executive agencies),164 the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of notice (applicable 
across branches),165 the common law and First Amendment right of access to 
courts (applicable to judicial opinions),166 court rules and practices regarding 
President’s warrantless surveillance program, in late October 2001, included only four members. See 
PSP REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. Some months thereafter, the chief judge of the FISC was briefed on 
the program. Id. at 17. 
161. See Kitrosser, supra note 82, at 1069–70. 
162. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text; see also Metzger, supra note 81, at 437–47 
(arguing that external constraints reinforce internal checks within the Executive Branch and that 
internal constraints can, in turn, permit greater external checks and balances). 
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
164. 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511 (2012). 
165. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 171 (1972) 
(holding unconstitutional a statute that failed to provide notice of what conduct it prohibited). 
166. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) 
(establishing First Amendment right of access to court proceedings); Co. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 
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the sealing of judicial opinions,167 
See, e.g., United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 843 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006) (denying motion to 
seal because “decisions of the court are a matter of public record” and no exception applied); Union Oil 
Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting party’s request to seal 
proceedings because “judicial proceedings are public” and “genuine trade secrets” exception did not 
apply); D. CONN. R. CIV. P. 5(e)(1)(b)(3) (discussing local rules for sealing). See generally Motion of the 
American Civil Liberties Union for the Release of Court Records, In Re Ops. & Orders of This Ct. 
Containing Novel or Significant Interpretations of Law at 11–15, No. 16-01 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 
Oct. 19, 2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/mfia/document/2016_motion_2.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ETS4-RP26] (documenting the history of judicial publication of opinions). 
and the Presentment and Journal Clauses of 
the Constitution (applicable to Congress).168 The law governing unauthorized 
leaks might also be regarded as part of the law of secret law insofar as leaks are 
a significant means by which secret laws come to light.169 
Unauthorized leaks are usually—but not always—illegal. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker 
Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 
490–512 (2014) (discussing the legal framework that governs leaks); David E. Pozen, The Leaky 
Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 512, 522–27 (2013) (same); Morton H. Halperin, Criminal Penalties for Disclosing 
Classified Information to the Press in the United States, RIGHT2INFO.ORG (2012), http://www.right2info. 
org/resources/publications/Halperin_CriminalPenaltiesforDisclosingClassifiedInformationtothePressin 
theUnitedStates.pdf [http://perma.cc/5RYB-9K39] (same). Commentators disagree about whether the First 
Amendment protects some leaks of classified information. Compare Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the 
Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L 
SEC. L. & POL’Y 409, 411 (2013) (arguing in favor of First Amendment protection for classified information 
leaks), and Papandrea, supra, at 453 (same), with GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, 
THE MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAW 81 (2010) (contending that the First Amendment does not protect unauthor­
ized disclosures of classified information), Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amend­
ment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1167–68 (2002) (same), and Geoffrey R. 
Stone, WikiLeaks and the First Amendment, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 485 (2012) (same). 
Each of these sources of law regulates whether and when the law must be 
made public or may be kept secret. Where these sources of law permit excep­
tions to a disclosure obligation—or impose no disclosure obligation at all— 
there is space for the creation of secret law. 
It is important to note that the boundaries between domains where the law 
must be made public and those where it may arguably be kept secret are often 
unclear or disputed. Determining where these boundaries lie is difficult when 
the scope—or even the existence—of certain pockets of secret law may remain 
unknown. In any case, I do not purport to provide a comprehensive statement of 
the law of secret law, but rather a synoptic view of the most important features 
of the legal ecosystem that regulates secret law in the Executive Branch. These 
are the Due Process Clause, the Federal Register Act (and certain other statutory 
disclosure obligations on Presidential lawmaking), and the Freedom of Informa­
tion Act. The description provided here will illustrate the overall structure of the 
law of secret law and the key tensions and tendencies within it. It will also 
246, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding First Amendment right of access extends to court opinions); 
Lowenschuss v. W. Publ’g Co., 542 F.2d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[U]nder our system of jurisprudence 
the judiciary has the duty of publishing and disseminating its decisions.”). 
167. 
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
169. 
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motivate the reform proposals I describe in the next Part, which aim to make the 
law of secret law more attentive to anti-secrecy values already discussed. 
A. DUE PROCESS OBLIGATIONS TO DISCLOSE THE LAW 
“Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that 
‘[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or 
forbids.’”170 The Due Process Clause has thus been interpreted to impose a 
constitutional obligation on the state to say what the law is—at least sometimes. 
The principle has its home in criminal law, where statutes defining offenses will 
be struck down if they are too vague,171 will be interpreted narrowly where they 
are ambiguous,172 and will only be applied prospectively.173 These constitu­
tional rules protect the principle that individuals may not suffer criminal 
penalties or “grave” civil consequences174 if they cannot know in advance the 
law to which they are subject. 
These constitutional rules implicitly forbid secret law, but only where the law 
quite directly regulates the public and only where it implicates constitutionally 
protected interests. Under the Due Process Clause, there can be no criminal 
prosecution, for example, for violating a secret law. But these safeguards apply 
only where the law treads upon an individual’s constitutionally cognizable 
interests in life, liberty, or property.175 Moreover, even where cognizable inter­
ests are engaged, the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause are weaker 
where the law prescribes no criminal sanction or grave civil penalty.176 For 
example, with respect to civil laws prescribing only monetary penalties, the 
courts have required, in most cases, only “fair notice,” which can be satisfied 
simply by informing the regulated entity, rather than the public at large, that 
they are in violation of the law.177 Where an agency chooses to enforce its own 
internal interpretations of a law or regulation, the Due Process Clause does not 
require the agency to publish those internal—in other words, secret— 
interpretations to the general public. Instead, the Due Process Clause is satisfied 
if the agency simply provides the regulated entity with a private warning in 
advance of enforcement that the agency believes particular conduct to be 
170. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) 
(alteration in original)). 
171. See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); Connally v. Gen. 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
172. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971). 
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
174. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (considering vagueness challenge to law 
specifying when an immigrant may be deported). 
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
176. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231 (applying due process protections established in criminal cases to 
the context of civil deportation proceedings because of the “grave” consequences at stake). 
177. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying “fair 
notice” standard to EPA regulation enforceable by civil fine); Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety 
& Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying “fair notice” standard in 
context of sanctions for violating OSHA regulation). 
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illegal.178 
Due process obligations to publish the law are therefore fairly circumscribed; 
in the national security context they may be narrower still. This question was 
brought to court in the context of the targeted killings of U.S. citizens abroad. In 
2009, the American Civil Liberties Union and Center for Constitutional Rights 
filed suit arguing, among other things, that a planned drone strike targeting a 
U.S. citizen in Yemen violated the Due Process Clause because the government 
had failed to disclose the applicable legal rules and standards specifying when 
citizens could be killed outside of a traditional battlefield context.179 In re­
sponse, the government argued that no such disclosure was required,180 offering 
two reasons: first, that disclosure of the rules would harm national security,181 
and second, that disclosure of the rules was unnecessary because the targeted 
individual would know that playing an operational role in a terrorist organiza­
tion (as the individual in question was alleged to have done) made him liable to 
be killed under general domestic and international law standards.182 In other 
words, the government contended that in the national security context, due 
process does not require the government to disclose its legal standards even for 
killing U.S. citizens, so long as the citizen is presumed to be on notice that he is 
liable to have his life taken.183 Courts in other cases implicating security 
concerns have dismissed due process arguments for the disclosure of secret law 
on similar grounds.184 
Due process is weak protection in the national security context for another 
reason: although programs like surveillance and watchlisting have serious 
consequences for individuals and raise significant civil liberties concerns, they 
may nevertheless fail to trigger any due process notice requirements because 
178. See Gates & Fox Co., 790 F.2d at 156. 
179. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010). In the interest of full disclosure, 
the author was among counsel for the plaintiff in the lawsuit. 
180. See Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support 
of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 29 n.14, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(No. 10-cv-1469). 
181. Id. at 29 n.14, 56. 
182. Id. at 29 n.14. Of course, what those domestic and international law standards required was 
precisely what was in dispute in the lawsuit. 
183. The court ultimately did not reach the merits of these due process arguments, dismissing the 
case under the political question doctrine and for lack of standing. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
184. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 
929 (2007) (declining to require the TSA to disclose its secret regulations regarding identification for 
air travel, suggesting that due process notice requirements were diminished or absent because the 
regulations did not have penal consequences, and that, in any case, the plaintiff received adequate 
notice of the TSA’s policy when airline personnel told him—without permitting him to see the rules 
themselves—that without identification he would be denied boarding); Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 
1134, 1141 & n.3 (D. Or. 2014) (refusing to disclose the regulations that govern the No-Fly List and 
other government watch lists, contending that such information is “Sensitive Security Information”); 
see also Amici Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of the Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari at 5, Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (2006) (No. 06-211) (arguing that public 
conduct cannot be governed by secret law). 
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they may not engage constitutionally protected interests in life, liberty, or 
property. 
Take, for instance, the rules governing how the government may collect data 
pursuant to foreign surveillance authorities or the “minimization” rules that 
dictate how the government must handle communications of U.S. citizens that 
are intercepted.185 It matters a great deal to people whether and when such 
information may be obtained and retained by the government, how and when it 
can be shared with other agencies, whether it can be used to enforce ordinary 
domestic criminal or civil laws, and whether it can be shared with private 
entities like employers, educational institutions, private security companies, 
data brokers, and others.186 Yet the rules governing all of these activities do not 
appear to implicate due process because surveillance and data collection do not 
directly set out prohibitions or obligations on individual conduct and probably 
do not trigger any constitutionally protected liberty or property interests under 
the Due Process Clause.187 
Similarly, the secret rules that govern terrorism watchlisting programs typi­
cally do not implicate due process, except when a watch list is used as a basis to 
interfere with a constitutionally protected right, such as the right to travel.188 
Even then, due process may not require the government to disclose the stan­
dards it uses to make watchlisting decisions, but may only require notice to 
individuals that they have, in fact, been watchlisted and perhaps the specific 
reasons why they were listed.189 
185. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
186. There is a large and growing literature exploring the nature of the harms that may result from 
surveillance. See, e.g., NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2015); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Neil Richards, The 
Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013). 
187. To be sure, government surveillance may be regulated by the Constitution’s Fourth Amend­
ment. But the Fourth Amendment’s notice requirements are generally understood to require, at most, 
notice to the target of a search that he or she has been searched. See Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 
156, 851–59 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to require notice of a search to 
targets of government searches); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, 
and the Fourth Amendment “Rule Requiring Notice,” 41 PEPP. L. REV. 509 (2014) (documenting the 
increased use of “sneak and peek” searches in which notice to targets is delayed and arguing that such 
searches violate a Fourth Amendment “rule requiring notice”). There may be an argument that the 
Fourth Amendment requires more than individualized notice; perhaps the Fourth Amendment’s notice 
and reasonableness requirements mean that targets of surveillance must have access to the rules that 
govern such searches and not simply the fact that they have been searched. Such arguments, however, 
are speculative under existing case law and await further development. 
188. See Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1141 (considering a challenge to the No-Fly List). 
189. In the No-Fly List case, where the court held that Due Process was implicated, the court did not 
order the government to disclose the specific detailed criteria that it uses to determine whether to place 
someone on the No-Fly List or to remove them. Id. The government subsequently amended its 
procedures such that U.S. persons on the No-Fly List may sometimes learn at least some of the reasons 
why they were listed. See Latif v. Sessions, No. 10-cv-750, 2017 WL 1434648, at *2–3 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 
2017), appeal pending sub nom. Kariye v. Sessions, No. 17-35634 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2017). 
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These examples show that due process is weak medicine against secret law 
for a broad range of national security programs.190 Where laws do not prescribe 
consequences that directly implicate constitutionally protected interests, due 
process will have nothing to say. And even if due process rights are engaged, 
they may be satisfied by providing individual notice or warnings, rather than by 
publicly disclosing the governing rules. 
B. SECRET PRESIDENTIAL LAWMAKING AND THE FEDERAL REGISTER ACT 
The most prominent sources of law currently regulating secret law in the 
Executive Branch are not constitutional but statutory: The Federal Register Act 
(FRA) and The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). These statutes purport to 
require that legal rules be published but, as I will show, each offers plenty of 
space for law to hide. I discuss the FRA and other potential legal constraints on 
presidential discretion to make secret law in this section. In the next section, I 
explain how FOIA regulates secret law in the Executive Branch more broadly. 
The FRA was a landmark piece of legislation when enacted in 1935. It 
established, finally, a centralized place where agency law would be published, 
the Federal Register.191 The law was specifically meant to address a problem of 
secret law; before its enactment, administrative lawmaking was so disorderly 
and haphazard that even “[t]he officers of the government itself frequently [did] 
not know the applicable regulations.”192 Administrative rules were secret not 
because they were intentionally concealed but because they were buried inside 
the many new and expanding federal bureaucracies of the New Deal era. 
The FRA sought to fix the problem by mandating centralized publication of 
“Presidential proclamations and Executive orders” of “general applicability and 
legal effect” so long as they were not “effective only against Federal agencies or 
persons in their capacity as officers.”193 In other words, executive laws that 
regulated the public—those with the most direct external effects—should be 
published. 
Unfortunately, this mandate was mostly voluntary. The statute left it to the 
President to determine which documents were of “general applicability and 
190. See generally Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) (describing 
programs that evade due process protection). 
191. Federal Register Act, Pub. L. No. 74-220, § 3, 49 Stat. 500, 500–01 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1511 (2012)). 
192. See Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better Publication of 
Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 204 & n.24 (1934). In two particularly embarrassing 
instances, government lawyers litigated a criminal case up to the Supreme Court before realizing that 
the regulations in question had been changed or withdrawn. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 
388, 412 (1935) (explaining that “the persons affected, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts, were 
alike ignorant of the alteration” in the applicable provision of law, such that “the attack in this respect 
was upon a provision which did not exist”); United States v. Smith, 293 U.S. 633 (1934) (dismissing 
case upon discovering the regulation had changed); Griswold, supra, at 204 & n.24; The Federal 
Register and the Code of Federal Regulations—A Reappraisal, 80 HARV. L. REV. 439, 440 & n.15 
(1966). 
193. See Federal Register Act § 5(a)(1). 
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legal effect” and therefore required publication.194 The law’s only unequivocal 
requirement was to publish “document[s] or order[s] which . . .  prescribe a 
penalty.”195 This state of affairs continues to this day.196 
As a result, the FRA is an extraordinarily weak protection against secret law, 
giving the President broad discretion to determine which executive orders must 
be published. Indeed, the requirements of the FRA can be entirely evaded 
simply by calling a presidential directive something other than an “executive 
order” or “proclamation.”197 Thus, unsurprisingly, presidents have been issuing 
unpublished national security directives almost since the FRA was enacted,198 
under names like Presidential Policy Directive or, more recently, National 
Security Presidential Memorandum.199 
 Each President appears to have chosen a different title for such orders. See RELYEA, supra note 
198, at 8–12; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-92-72, THE USE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DIRECTIVES TO MAKE AND IMPLEMENT U.S. POLICY 1–2 (1992); Presidential Directives and Executive 
Orders, FED’N OF A M. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm [https://perma.cc/X6SM-DRND]. 
According to the DOJ, such unpublished 
directives have the same force of law as executive orders promulgated pursuant 
to the FRA.200 
The President’s discretion goes beyond issuing secret directives and extends 
even to secretly modifying public directives. The administration of President 
George W. Bush secretly revoked or modified public executive orders so that 
the law on the books was not in fact the law being applied internally.201 Because 
the changes were made via secret directives, both Congress and the public 
remained unaware of the discrepancy for years.202 
Congress has imposed only modest additional constraints on the President’s 
power to make law in secret in the national security context. In some circum­
stances, Congress has imposed a requirement, often waivable, that certain 
194. Id. § 5(a). 
195. Id. § 5(a)(3). 
196. Since 1954, the President has delegated to the Attorney General and Archivist the authority to 
determine what must be published, but the applicable statutory requirements of the FRA remain 
unchanged since enactment. See Exec. Order No. 10,530, 19 Fed. Reg. 2709, 2712 (May 12, 1954), 
reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 301 app. at 666 (2012); 44 U.S.C. §§ 1505–1506 (2012). 
197. See Federal Register Act § 5(a)(1) (expressly applying only to “Presidential proclamations and 
Executive orders”). 
198. See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 98–611, PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES: BACK­
GROUND AND OVERVIEW 9 (2008); John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: 
Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 357–58 (2010). 
199.
200. See Legal Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, as Compared to an Exec. Order, 24 Op. 
O.L.C. 29, 29 (2000) (finding no “substantive legal difference between an executive order and a 
presidential directive” and determining that, like executive orders, directives do not “lapse upon a 
change of administration” but “remain effective until subsequent presidential action is taken”). 
201. See Secret Law Hearing, supra note 135, at 124 (testimony of Dawn E. Johnsen). In 2008, a bill 
was introduced in the Senate that would have required the President to publish notice of such secret 
amendments in the Federal Register or, in the case of classified information, to notify certain members 
of Congress. See Executive Order Integrity Act of 2008, S. 3405, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008). The bill was 
never enacted. It is unclear whether the current administration claims this authority, or whether it has 
been used. 
202. See Secret Law Hearing, supra note 135, at 124–25, 128–29 (testimony of Dawn E. Johnsen). 
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members of Congress—but not the public—must be informed. For instance, if 
the President makes a determination that a congressional statute is unconstitu­
tional and, on that basis, declines to enforce or apply it, he typically must 
inform certain members of Congress.203 Even this minimal requirement only 
applies to “the promulgation of any unclassified Executive order or similar 
memorandum or order,” thus apparently leaving the President free to determine 
that a statute is unconstitutional in a classified directive without notifying 
Congress at all.204 Thus, somewhat startlingly, the President is empowered to 
make the momentous decision to unilaterally determine a statute is unconstitu­
tional without informing even Congress. 
These weak congressional disclosure requirements can also be evaded by 
creative lawyering. During the George W. Bush Administration, the DOJ often 
avoided determining that statutes were unconstitutional—potentially triggering 
a disclosure obligation—and instead deployed the canon of constitutional avoid­
ance to aggressively reinterpret statutes so that they would not apply in a given 
circumstance.205 Such avoidance decisions are not subject to any statutory 
disclosure obligations, allowing the Executive to achieve the same result as a 
determination of unconstitutionality without triggering any statutory notification 
requirement.206 
Presidential discretion to issue secret law is also unregulated by FOIA.207 The 
Office of the President and his immediate advisors are simply not subject to 
FOIA’s disclosure requirements.208 This is not to say that presidential orders 
with the force of law are entirely beyond FOIA’s reach; if such directives are 
distributed beyond the President’s close advisors and a copy ends up residing 
with another agency, then it may be subject to a FOIA request.209 But, like the 
203. See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a), (e) (2012). The President need only notify the leadership of each 
party in each house, the general counsel of each house, and the chair and ranking members of each 
house’s Committee on the Judiciary. § 530D(a)(2). 
204. Id. § 530D(e) (emphasis added). Only the President enjoys this power. Other Cabinet officials— 
notably the Attorney General—must always disclose to Congress when they decide not to apply a 
statute on the grounds of its unconstitutionality. Id. 
205. See Secret Law Hearing, supra note 135, at 128–29 (testimony of Dawn E. Johnsen); Johnsen, 
supra note 106, at 1598–600. 
206. See Secret Law Hearing, supra note 135, at 128–29 (testimony of Dawn E. Johnsen). A bill 
introduced in 2008 would have required congressional notification when the Attorney General inter­
preted statutes to avoid constitutional concerns under Article II of the Constitution or separation of 
powers principles. See OLC Reporting Act of 2008, S. 3501, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008). The bill was 
never enacted. 
207. The disclosure requirements of FOIA are discussed infra Section IV.C. 
208. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). But not 
all components of the Executive Office of the President are exempt. Compare Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 
1067, 1075–76 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding Office of Science and Technology is subject to FOIA), with 
Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, 811 F.3d 542, 553 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining the 
National Security Council is not subject to FOIA). 
209. See, e.g., Ctr. for Effective Gov’t v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 7 F. Supp. 3d 16, 29 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(ordering disclosure of Presidential Policy Directive that had been widely distributed within the 
government). 
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FRA, FOIA leaves the President free to keep law secret in the first 
instance. 
The President thus enjoys significant latitude to exercise his lawmaking 
functions in secret. Where the President decides not to share his determinations 
with the public, he is essentially free to make that choice. Disclosure to 
Congress is only sometimes required and these requirements, too, can be 
evaded. The law of secret law leaves Presidents with remarkable latitude to 
legislate in secret if and when they choose. 
C. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
The Freedom of Information Act is perhaps the most important element of the 
law of secret law. FOIA is the principal framework statute governing secrecy in 
the Executive Branch and the public’s most powerful tool to force disclosure of 
documents, including legal texts.210 It creates a presumption that all Executive 
Branch records are public, subject only to certain enumerated exemptions.211 
However, as explained below, those exemptions have increasingly been inter­
preted to authorize the government to withhold law, threatening to transform 
FOIA from a statute that was meant as a bulwark against secret law into a 
statute that legitimizes it. 
FOIA was enacted in 1966, establishing a tripartite disclosure regime that 
persists to this day. It requires, first, that some materials, including formal 
statements of agency law, must be affirmatively published in the Federal 
Register.212 Second, other materials, including agency opinions and interpreta­
tions, must also be made available automatically in reading rooms and on­
line.213 Third, any and all other agency records are presumptively available to 
everyone—but only upon request.214 
FOIA is most famous for this last provision, but the first two—which require 
affirmative disclosure of agency law—are key elements of the law of secret law. 
Specifically, the Federal Register provision requires disclosure of “substantive 
rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law” and “statements of 
general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency,” in 
addition to “the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures,” 
“rules of procedure,” and “statements of the general course and method by 
210. See Pozen, supra note 21, at 314 n.204 (describing FOIA as a “super-statute” and explaining 
that “FOIA introduced a norm of open access to government documents that has commanded deep 
public loyalty, taken on a quasi-constitutional valence, and spawned a vast network of imitator laws at 
all levels of United States government and in democracies around the world. FOIA is such a good 
example of a super-statute that it is surprising no one has assigned it the label yet.” (citing William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) for the term “super-
statute”)). 
211. See U.S. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–61 (1976); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
212. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012). 
213. See id. § 552(a)(2). 
214. Id. § 552(a)(3). 
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which [the agency’s] functions are channeled and determined.”215 The reading 
room provision supplements these disclosure requirements by mandating that 
agencies make available any other documents that might constitute authoritative 
rules or guidance—in other words, “statements of policy and interpretations” 
that are not otherwise published in the Federal Register, such as those that are 
not of “general applicability,” as well as agency “opinions,” “orders,” and 
“administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of 
the public.”216 
On their face, these two provisions appear to require affirmative disclosure of 
much, perhaps all, secret law. On closer inspection they do much less. For 
starters, the government takes a narrow view of its affirmative disclosure 
obligations. For instance, the government has repeatedly maintained that OLC 
opinions do not constitute the kinds of “opinions” or “interpretations” encom­
passed within FOIA’s reading room provision because such opinions are not 
always formally “adopted” by the agency for which they are written.217 
Worse still, FOIA allows agencies to fail to publish without significant 
consequence. Courts have thus far done little to clarify the scope of the 
affirmative disclosure provisions of FOIA218 
215. Id. § 552(a)(1). The predecessor to this provision in section 3 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) was narrower. For instance, the original provision, which FOIA replaced, limited the 
publication requirement for “substantive rules . . . and  statements of general policy or interpretations” 
to those “adopted . . . for  the  guidance of the public.” Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 
79-404 § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946). The APA also completely excluded any “matter relating solely 
to the internal management of an agency.” APA § 3. FOIA eliminated these provisions, suggesting it 
was intended to require publication of general rules and policies governing internal operations of 
government, and not just those imposing requirements on public conduct. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). 
216. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). Again, the parallel provision in the original APA was much narrower, 
requiring only that “all rules” be published as well as “final opinions or orders in the adjudication of 
cases.” APA § 3(b). FOIA adds the requirements to disclose “statements of policy and interpretations” 
not found in the Federal Register, as well as “administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that 
affect a member of the public.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). 
217. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 25–26, Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 
13-cv-1291). 
218. The Campaign for Accountability is currently engaged in litigation seeking a prospective 
injunction that would require the OLC to affirmatively disclose opinions that constitute binding law for 
the Executive Branch. See Campaign for Accountability v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 16-cv-1068, 2017 
WL 4480828, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2017). The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on the 
grounds that its request for an order requiring disclosure of “all [OLC] opinions that have precedential 
effect within the Executive Branch” failed to identify a sufficiently specific subset of OLC opinions 
plausibly within the ambit of FOIA’s reading room provision. Id. at *1, *15–16 (emphasis in original). 
The plaintiff subsequently identified five specific categories of OLC opinions that it contends are 
subject to affirmative disclosure. See Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 
13–19, Campaign for Accountability, 2017 WL 4480828 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2017), https:// 
campaignforaccountability.org/work/office-legal-counsel-filings [https://perma.cc/Y3FZ-G9GP]. As of 
this writing, litigation remains ongoing. 
and have only recently affirmed 
that courts even have authority to order prospective compliance with those 
850 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 106:803 
obligations.219 To be sure, FOIA does include a mechanism meant to incentivize 
compliance: FOIA prevents agencies from relying on unpublished rules or 
documents in administrative enforcement proceedings.220 But this mechanism is 
perhaps utterly toothless in the national security context because, as explained 
below, the government contends that it is under no obligation to disclose secret 
law in the first place if the law has been classified or falls within another 
exemption to FOIA.221 Moreover, even if the government were under an 
obligation to publish secret rules, the provision of FOIA preventing agency 
reliance on unpublished material has been severely weakened by the courts.222 
As a result, even authoritative DOJ legal interpretations are not published as a 
matter of course, and the rules that govern programs in the national security 
context are even less frequently published.223 
219. The D.C. Circuit recently held that courts only have authority to enforce the affirmative 
disclosure provisions of FOIA by ordering prospective disclosure to a particular requester; they lack 
authority to order prospective disclosure to the general public. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics 
in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 846 F.3d 1235, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2017). As of this writing, the same 
issue is on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, No. 
17-cv-949, 2017 WL 2352009, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2017) (adopting the D.C. Circuit’s holding), 
subsequent determination, 2017 WL 3478848 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-16858 
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2017). 
220. FOIA provides that where an agency fails to publish a legal text as required—be it a rule, 
opinion, or order—it cannot be used against a member of the public. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(2) 
(2012). But these preclusion rules are tempered by a statutory exception excluding an affected person 
who has actual notice of the terms of the unpublished document. See id. § 552(a)(1). Thus, this 
mechanism fails meaningfully to incentivize disclosure to the general public because notice to affected 
individuals suffices. Such a weak preclusion rule does not incentivize agencies to publish laws they 
would rather withhold. 
221. As discussed below, the government has refused to disclose secret law by relying on FOIA’s 
exemption for classified national security information and related exemptions. See infra notes 230–43 
and accompanying text. Courts have largely endorsed this position in lawsuits seeking documents under 
FOIA’s disclosure-upon-request provision. See infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. The same 
reasoning would appear to exclude classified or otherwise exempt rules from FOIA’s affirmative 
disclosure provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (stating that “[t]his section”—that is, the entire FOIA 
including the affirmative disclosure provisions—“does not apply to matters that are specifically 
authorized . . . to  be  kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact 
properly classified.” (emphasis added)). 
222. The requirement of individual notice has been weakened by the courts, which have essentially 
adopted a harmless error rule: The government is precluded from using an unpublished rule against an 
individual only if the individual can show that “they have been in fact adversely affected by the lack of 
notice,” in the sense that “[they] would have been able to pursue an alternative course of conduct” or 
otherwise avoid the consequence envisioned by the secret law had the law in question had been 
published. All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA., 15 F.3d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to OLC Attorneys 
1, 5–6 (July 16, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice­
opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RFH-RNXE] (describing “best practices OLC attorneys should follow 
in providing . . .  formal written opinions”); Campaign for Accountability, 2017 WL 4480828, at *4. 
223. 
In short, it turns out that agencies 
can readily evade affirmative disclosure requirements when it comes to secret 
law. 
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Equally important to the law of secret law are the exemptions written into 
FOIA itself.224 FOIA includes nine enumerated categories of records not subject 
to disclosure that permit the government to withhold records even in response to 
a specific disclosure request.225 If secret law can be withheld under any of these 
exemptions, FOIA becomes a license for secret law rather than a limit. 
There is good reason to believe that the exemptions were not meant to permit 
withholding of agency law. FOIA was enacted specifically to correct the deficien­
cies of its predecessor, the Administrative Procedure Act, which gave agencies 
essentially unfettered discretion to withhold agency law and other material.226 
Against this backdrop, FOIA’s affirmative disclosure provisions were meant to 
ensure both that law would not remain practically obscure227 and that officials 
would be required to publish agency law in the first place.228 Relatedly, it has 
long been clear that FOIA’s exemptions “must be narrowly construed” to 
advance “the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective 
of the Act.”229 
In FOIA’s early years, the courts strongly endorsed this view, establishing the 
“secret law” doctrine (also known as the “working law” doctrine) that limited 
the scope of FOIA exemptions so that they could not be used to withhold 
agency law.230 The Supreme Court explicitly endorsed this anti-secret law 
224. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
225. See id.; Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 564 (2011). 
226. Section 3 of the original APA permitted secrecy even of formal rules whenever “there is 
involved any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest.” Pub. L. No. 79-404 
§ 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946). With respect to reading room materials, agencies had additional discretion 
to refuse to publish “for good cause.” Id. § 3(b). And the APA’s catch-all provision for public access to 
official records—the predecessor to the modern day disclosure-upon-request provision—contained a 
“double-barreled loophole” allowing disclosure only “to persons properly and directly concerned” and 
even then allowing agencies to refuse disclosure “for good cause found.” S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 5 
(1965). The Senate, in passing FOIA, explained that the APA had “been used more as an excuse for 
withholding than as a disclosure statute.” Id. at 3. 
227. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2012). 
228. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optimal Extent of Disclosure Under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 777 (1980) (“[T]he primary objective is the elimination of 
‘secret law.’ Under the FOIA an agency must disclose its rules governing relationships with private 
parties and its demands on private conduct.”). 
229. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). 
230. The secret law doctrine dates to FOIA’s early days, when courts recognized that the statute was 
intended to do away with—or at least limit—secret law. A mere two years after FOIA came into force, 
the D.C. Circuit ordered the government to disclose an internal memorandum that constituted the legal 
rationale for a series of decisions ordering repayment of certain subsidies. See Am. Mail Line, Ltd. v. 
Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Subsequent cases elaborated this theme, consistently 
rejecting efforts by the government to withhold a variety of secret laws, including authoritative 
memoranda providing reasons for agency decisions, see Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); documents embodying agency policy determinations, see Ash Grove Cement Co. v. 
FTC, 511 F.2d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and legal opinions issued by agency counsel relied upon by 
frontline staff, see Coastal States Gas Corp. v U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
As the D.C. Circuit explained in 1971, “binding agency opinions and interpretations . . . are  not  the
ideas and theories which go into the making of the law, they are the law itself, and as such should be 
made available to the public.” Sterling Drug Inc., 450 F.2d at 708. This construction of FOIA was 
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principle in 1975 in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.231 In that case, the 
government argued that certain agency interpretations of law were exempt 
under Exemption 5, which permits the withholding of internal government 
communications that are subject to privilege, particularly the deliberative pro­
cess privilege.232 The Court rejected this argument, holding that “Exemption 5, 
properly construed, calls for ‘disclosure of all “opinions and interpretations” 
which embody the agency’s effective law and policy.’”233 The Court reasoned 
that the structure of the Act, particularly the provisions regarding automatic 
publication of agency law, “represents a strong congressional aversion to ‘secret 
(agency) law,’ and represents an affirmative congressional purpose to require 
disclosure of documents which have ‘the force and effect of law.’”234 
Some lower courts subsequently extended the secret law doctrine articulated 
in Sears, Roebuck & Co. to limit the scope of other privileges that can be 
asserted under Exemption 5, including the attorney–client privilege.235 The 
secret law doctrine also acted as a limit on the now-defunct “High 2” exemp­
tion, which permitted agencies to withhold documents that could be used to 
“circumvent agency regulation.”236 
But in more recent years, the courts have retreated from this anti-secret law 
principle, progressively narrowing the scope of the secret law doctrine, declin­
ing to extend application of the doctrine beyond Exemption 5, and explicitly 
permitting the government to maintain secret law in cases involving national 
security and law enforcement exemptions. Indeed, a number of district courts 
have now found that the secret law doctrine is no limit to Exemption 1 (which 
permits the withholding of properly classified information),237 Exemption 3 
(which incorporates statutory protections specific to the CIA, NSA, and other 
explicitly described as serving a statutory policy against secret law: “The purpose of this limitation is to 
prevent bodies of ‘secret law’ from being built up and applied by government agencies.” Schwartz v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., 511 F.2d 1303, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
231. 421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975). 
232. See id. at 148; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). 
233. Sears, 421 U.S. at 153 (citation omitted). 
234. Id. (citations omitted). 
235. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2012); Tax 
Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But see Am. Civil Liberties Union v. NSA, No. 
13-cv-9198, 2017 WL 1155910, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017) (holding that the secret law or 
“working law” doctrine does not apply to the presidential communications privilege). 
236. In Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en 
banc), the D.C. Circuit held that Exemption 2, which by its terms permits withholding of documents 
“related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), also 
encompassed a broad exemption for documents where “disclosure significantly risks circumvention of 
federal statutes or regulations.” Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1053. The Court imported the “secret law” 
doctrine as a limit on the exemption. Id. at 1073 (considering and rejecting whether the documents in 
question constituted secret law). Thirty years later, the Supreme Court overruled Crooker, holding that 
Exemption 2 does not include any exemption for risks of circumvention at all, and that it is only 
concerned with personnel and human resources matters. See Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 
562, 573–77 (2011). 
237. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). 
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agencies),238 and Exemption 7(E) (which permits the withholding of law enforce­
ment “techniques and procedures”).239 The trend in these cases has been to find 
that the secret law doctrine simply does not apply to these exemptions.240 In 
other words, the government can use these exemptions to withhold documents 
that articulate internal law on the same basis that it can withhold any ordinary 
document.241 The Second Circuit, in dicta, brushed aside the notion that the 
working law doctrine stands as a limit to withholding “documents [that] are 
classified and thus protected under Exemption 1.”242 In an unpublished opinion, 
the D.C. Circuit appears to have held that Exemption 1 permits the withholding 
of documents even if doing so would, as the plaintiff argued, “effectively 
sanction secret law in contravention of FOIA’s principal purposes.”243 
In addition to refusing to extend the secret law doctrine as a limit to national 
security and law enforcement exemptions, the lower courts have taken a narrow 
view of what even constitutes law for purposes of the existing secret law 
doctrine under Exemption 5. The D.C. Circuit requires that the legal text in 
question be “expressly adopted” by an agency or “incorporate[d] by reference” 
into its policy.244 Courts have come to interpret these requirements stringently, 
rejecting a pragmatic approach to whether a legal text constitutes working law 
and instead requiring formal, explicit, and overt adoption of a legal rule or 
opinion for it to come within the secret law doctrine. For instance, the courts 
have repeatedly held that OLC opinions can be withheld on the grounds that the 
238. Id. § 522(b)(3). 
239. Id. § 522(b)(7)(E). 
240. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-cv-7412, 2014 WL 956303, at 
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014) (holding that there is no “secret law” exception to the government’s 
authority to withhold law enforcement investigative techniques pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(E)); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that 
legal analysis can be classified “if it pertains to matters that are themselves classified” and holding with 
respect to Exemption 3, that “it may well be that legal analysis in a particular document is inextricably 
intertwined with information that is statutorily exempt from disclosure, including information about 
intelligence sources and methods that is statutorily exempt from disclosure”), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 872 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (declining “the invitation to read a ‘secret law’ exception into the FOIA exemptions” 
and specifically rejecting such an exception in the face of a claim for withholding under Exemptions 1 
and 3); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Office of the Dir. Of Nat’l Intelligence, No. 10-cv-4419, 2011 WL 
5563520, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011) (suggesting that agency could withhold under Exemption 1 
“legal memoranda, procedures, policies, directives, practices, or guidelines pertaining to Section 702 
surveillance” if it provided adequate explanation for why disclosure “would reveal information about 
the U.S. Intelligence Community’s capabilities, priorities, and activities”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), subsequent determination, 2012 WL 1117114, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (upholding 
agency determination to withhold records under Exemption 1); Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, 505 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that government could 
withhold as classified the U.S. interpretation of terms in a trade agreement if it were able to show harm 
to U.S. negotiating efforts and foreign relations). 
241. See Jaffer & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 242–43. 
242. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 806 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2015). 
243. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 640 F. App’x 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per 
curiam) (internal quotations omitted). 
244. See Elect. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 739 F.3d 1, 10–12 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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agency that sought the legal opinion did not formally adopt or incorporate the 
entire opinion into its own policy, even if the OLC opinion did, in practice, 
authoritatively set legal parameters for the agency.245 
This formalist approach to what constitutes agency law radically narrows 
FOIA’s protection against secret law. So long as the government officially 
disclaims formal adoption of a legal interpretation or rule, the government may 
withhold memoranda, directives, and opinions that are—as a matter of social 
fact and actual agency practice—treated as binding on government officials.246 
Still worse, the courts have placed the burden of proof on the FOIA requester to 
demonstrate whether the legal opinion sought has in fact been formally adopted 
as agency policy—even though the government is typically the only party in a 
position to know whether that is the case.247 
These developments in the secret law doctrine have essentially drawn a 
roadmap for agencies to create secret law, rather than putting up a roadblock 
against it. Agencies wishing to keep law secret simply need to take care not to 
explicitly or overtly “adopt” a legal interpretation as “policy.” Even when a 
legal rule or interpretation is officially adopted, it can be withheld just as easily 
as any other agency record simply by marking it “classified” or invoking 
another national security or law enforcement exemption. 
Thus, paradoxically, FOIA—a statute that was intended to uproot secret 
law—is being interpreted to codify the Executive’s discretion to keep law 
secret. In the absence of judicial or legislative intervention to reverse this trend 
toward endorsing secret law, FOIA may serve to institutionalize secret law as a 
prerogative of the Executive Branch. 
In addition, for structural and practical reasons, FOIA would be an imperfect 
check against secret law even if it had not been interpreted to allow secret law. 
Most importantly, to file a FOIA request, a member of the public must know 
what to ask for, and from whom.248 But there is nothing in FOIA that requires 
the government to inform the public about the rules or interpretations that it has 
adopted in secret; secrecy determinations are themselves typically made in 
secret. So members of the public will often be in a position only to make an 
educated guess about what secret law may exist—relying on press reports, 
245. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 806 F.3d at 687; Elect. Frontier Found., 739 F.3d at 10 (“Even if the 
OLC Opinion describes the legal parameters of what the FBI is permitted to do, it does not state or 
determine the FBI’s policy.”); Jaffer & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 246. 
246. See Jaffer & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 249. 
247. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 546–49 (S.D.NY. 2013) 
(permitting government to withhold OLC memo regarding targeted killing of citizen on grounds 
plaintiffs could not prove that the memo had been “expressly adopted” or that the memo sought was the 
basis for public comments of the government legal position on the issue), rev’d in part, 756 F.3d 100 
(2d Cir. 2014). 
248. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012) (noting request must be submitted to particular agency and 
“reasonably describe” records sought). Many agencies have divided themselves into multiple distinct 
units for FOIA purposes, further complicating the requester’s task. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.1(c), 
16.3(a) (2017) (describing DOJ’s decentralized system for processing FOIA requests). 
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anecdotal experience dealing with agencies, or other sources—and then to file 
FOIA requests on that basis. This is a significant obstacle. When it comes to 
secret law, the public does not always know what it does not know. Law, in 
other words, may be an “unknown unknown” in the sense that even the fact of 
its existence is uncertain. 
Even in cases in which members of the public have reason to suspect that 
secret law exists, the government has many tools at its disposal to delay or deny 
disclosure in response to a request. For instance, the government can simply fail 
to respond and hope the requester never files suit to enforce her request.249 The 
government can also put up obstacles to disclosure by refusing even to confirm 
or deny whether a secret law exists.250 
This is known as a “Glomar” response. See Nathan Freed Wessler, “[We] Can Neither Confirm 
Nor Deny the Existence or Nonexistence of Records Responsive to Your Request”: Reforming the 
Glomar Response Under FOIA, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2010). For an entertaining history of the 
Glomar response—including where it got its name—see Neither Confirm Nor Deny, RADIOLAB (Feb. 12, 
2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.radiolab.org/story/confirm-nor-deny [https://perma.cc/3VJS-N5DZ]. 
This amounts to a claim that the fact of 
the secret law’s existence (or nonexistence) is properly kept secret.251 
Finally, litigation over even a limited subset of legal texts can take years and 
an enormous commitment of legal resources from public interest organizations 
or the press.252 So even where litigation is ultimately successful, the public will 
typically remain in the dark for years, and disclosure will lag any changes in the 
substance of the secret law that have occurred while the litigation was pending. 
For all of these reasons, FOIA is a cumbersome, inefficient, and often ineffec­
tive means of enforcing a government obligation to make law public. 
* * *  
As should be clear by now, the legal ecosystem governing secret law—from 
Due Process to the Federal Records Act to FOIA—provides broad discretion to 
create and maintain secret law. Affirmative disclosure rules meant to require 
publication of agency law turn out to be essentially voluntary or easily evaded. 
The President has explicit authority to issue—or modify—directives in secret. 
Agencies can operate according to secret legal interpretations and rules by 
taking advantage of courts’ formalist view of what counts as working law. 
249. FOIA requires a response within twenty days, but this is perhaps the most frequently violated 
law in the U.S. Code. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). The remedy for a violation is that a requester may 
file suit. Id. § 552(a)(6)(C). 
250. 
251. See Pozen, supra note 21, at 313 n.203 (discussing the relationship between the Glomar 
response and deep secrets). 
252. For example, the first lawsuit seeking disclosure of the legal basis for targeted killings was filed 
in June 2010. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (D.D.C. 
2011) (Note: the author was among counsel for the plaintiffs in the initial stages of that litigation.). It 
took a separate lawsuit and four years of litigation before a single legal opinion on the issue was 
disclosed. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014). That litigation 
continued for two more years, producing only a handful of additional documents. See Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 844 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2016). Related litigation remained 
ongoing at the time of writing. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 15-cv-1954, 
2016 WL 8259331 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2016), appeal pending, No. 17-157 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2017). 
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Agencies can also simply stamp the relevant documents “classified” and with­
hold them under Exemption 1 or take advantage of related FOIA exemptions for 
national security or law enforcement information. In such cases, the courts will 
not enforce any secret law doctrine and will almost always defer to Executive 
Branch determinations.253 As the courts have retreated from any robust anti-
secret law principles, what has been left behind is a system that gives the 
Executive Branch enormous and mostly unchecked discretion to decide whether 
to keep its internal law secret. 
V. REFORMING THE LAW OF SECRET LAW 
The legal ecosystem that governs secret law is a surprisingly permissive 
place. The Executive Branch has broad discretion to adopt rules and interpreta­
tion in secret. Seen in this light, it is perhaps not surprising at all that secret law 
has become a regular feature of national security governance. Although Execu­
tive Branch officials may share and respect the transparency values that militate 
against secret law, the overriding and more immediate interests of the Executive 
almost always favor secrecy.254 Without effective checks and balances against 
secret law in the Executive Branch, the equilibrium between transparency and 
secrecy will be set in favor of the latter. 
As we have seen, the existing legal regime imposes few checks on this 
discretion. Courts have declined to interpret or enforce FOIA and other laws in 
ways that would impose real limits on the discretion of the Executive Branch to 
establish secret law.255 Congress has some inherent power to act as a check on 
secret law—for example, by threatening to hold up Executive Branch nomina­
tions or by otherwise frustrating administration priorities—but it has been 
reluctant to use these tools aggressively.256 In some instances, the combined 
253. See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, Securing Access to National Security Information, 67  
ADMIN. L. REV. ACCORD 78 (2014); Susan Nevelow Mart & Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-]Informing the People’s 
Discretion: Judicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information 
Act, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2014). 
254. From the perspective of an official deciding whether to keep rules secret, the risks from 
disclosure—any incremental threat to national security—will be much more vivid than the dispersed 
benefits of transparency. Indeed, it is the primary job of those in the national security establishment to 
look for such risks and avoid them whenever possible. Moreover, once a secrecy decision is made in the 
bureaucracy, it enjoys the benefit of inertia. Changing course in favor of more disclosure will face 
often-insurmountable hurdles, typically involving significant interagency consultation and consensus. 
These and other incentives toward executive secrecy have been widely explored in the literature on 
government overclassification, and there is little reason to believe they would be any less powerful 
when it comes to secret law. See, e.g., ELIZABETH GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE, REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 21–32 (2011); Steven Aftergood, 
Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 401–04 (2009). 
255. See supra Section IV.C. 
256. As a formal matter, each house of Congress also reserves the right to publicly disclose 
classified information upon a majority vote, but that mechanism has never been invoked. See Kitrosser, 
supra note 82, at 1080–83. 
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pressure from litigation, Congress, the media, unauthorized leaks,257 
In recent years, secret law has almost always come to light as a direct or indirect result of 
unauthorized, extralegal leaks. The Snowden disclosures of NSA surveillance are the prime example, 
but other examples abound. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Betsy Reed, Secret Docs Reveal: President 
Trump Has Inherited an FBI with Vast Hidden Powers, INTERCEPT (Jan. 31, 2017, 7:38 AM), https:// 
theintercept.com/2017/01/31/secret-docs-reveal-president-trump-has-inherited-an-fbi-with-vast­
hidden-powers/ [https://perma.cc/T3LZ-W2SQ] (reporting on leak of previously redacted portions of 
FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guidance and other documents); Michael Isikoff, Justice 
Department Memo Reveals Legal Case for Drone Strikes on Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2013, 5:57 
PM), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals­
legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans?lite [https://perma.cc/4GSR-HK9P] (reporting on leaked DOJ 
white paper describing legal rules governing targeted killings of U.S. citizens); Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey 
Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST (June 8, 2004), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html [https://perma.cc/7LEB-TMLD] (report­
ing on leaked memo authorizing torture); James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers 
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us­
spy-on-callers-without-courts.html?smid=pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2k90zpQ] (reporting on leaked de­
tails of warrantless wiretapping rules). 
and the 
public has—over the course of several years—prompted the administration to 
voluntarily change course and disclose some secret law.258 
257. 
258. The disclosure of the memo governing targeted killing of citizens is a prime example of a 
transparency campaign slowly prying secret law loose. Litigation seeking to force disclosure of the 
memos began in 2010 but foundered for years, with judges repeatedly deferring to the government’s 
claims of secrecy. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280, 301 
(D.D.C. 2011) (upholding secrecy), rev’d sub nom. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding government could no longer refuse to confirm or deny existence of records 
but remained free to resist disclosure on other grounds); Complaint, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, No. 10-cv-436 (D.D.C. June 1, 2010) (seeking the release of records relating to the use 
of drones to target and kill individuals); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 
553 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (upholding secrecy), rev’d, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding government 
waived secrecy and privilege as to legal analysis of OLC memorandum). In the meantime, Congress 
applied pressure by holding up the nomination of John Brennan to lead the CIA. See Michael D. Shear 
& Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo Backing Drone Attacks on Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/us/politics/obama-orders-release-of-drone-memos-to­
lawmakers.html [https://nyti.ms/2jHsjGD]. As a result, it seems, Congress disclosed the OLC memo to 
the congressional intelligence committees. Id. At nearly the same time, the press obtained a leaked copy 
of an unofficial DOJ “white paper” summarizing the still-secret memo. See Isikoff, supra note 257. The 
Second Circuit subsequently ordered disclosure of parts of the memo on the grounds that the 
government had waived its right to withhold it by disclosing the white paper and other information. 
N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 F.3d 100, 116–17, 124 (2d Cir. 2014). Under pressure from 
Congress, which was holding up the nomination of David Barron, the author of the OLC memo, to a 
judgeship on the First Circuit, the government elected not to seek further appellate review and 
voluntarily disclosed the memo with redactions. See Ashley Parker, Memo Approving Targeted Killing 
of U.S. Citizen to Be Released, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/us/ 
politics/memo-approving-targeted-killing-of-us-citizen-to-be-released.html?smid=pl-share [https://nyti. 
ms/2jHJ84p]. 
That this kind of 
“transparency campaign” is necessary to make a particular secret law public 
demonstrates that our current system is one in which the legal equilibrium 
permits far too much secrecy. Executive discretion to keep law secret is effectively 
governed by the vicissitudes of politics and whistleblowers—not by law. 
A reform agenda for secret law would reset this equilibrium by creating a 
legal regime that gives significant weight to transparency values and renders 
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secret law an exceptional practice that is permitted, if at all, only where truly 
necessary and justified.259 In what follows, I offer certain principles that should 
guide any such reform efforts and outline one promising pathway for reform 
that calls upon the authority and expertise of both the courts and Congress to 
rein in the practice of secret law in the Executive. 
A. PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM OF SECRET LAW 
The brief tour of the current law of secret law in Part IV, combined with the 
distinctions among secret laws introduced in Part III, point to a reform agenda 
that would rein in the practice of secret law. I propose three essential principles 
to guide such reform. 
First, there should be no such thing as a secret law whose very existence is a 
secret. When it comes to rules that govern the conduct of officials, the public 
must always know—at a minimum—that a secret law exists.260 Second, the 
extent of secrecy must always be kept to an absolute minimum. This should 
include a requirement that government officials pay specific attention to the five 
key characteristics of secret law.261 It should also require that decisions to keep 
law secret meet a higher standard of justification than the ordinary standard 
required to classify mere facts.262 Third, the legal standards that govern secret 
law should themselves be established in public by statute and should be 
enforceable by the courts. Just as FOIA empowers the courts to adjudicate 
compliance with laws restricting secrecy, the courts should be able to adjudicate 
whether the Executive Branch is complying with strict and public limits on 
secret law. In what follows, I briefly elaborate on each of these principles. 
1. No Secrets About the Scope of Secret Law 
The first principle for reform is that the public should know the true scope of 
the practice of secret law. Where the public is in the dark about the existence of 
secret law, concerns about democratic legitimacy, check and balances, and 
individual liberty are at their zenith. Moreover, if a secret law is unknown to the 
public, then even the weak checks that currently exist cannot be set in motion. 
Individuals cannot file FOIA lawsuits seeking judicial review. The public cannot 
engage its representatives in Congress to press for more transparency. Where 
the existence of the law is secret, it is essentially immune from democratic 
259. See Margaret Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1387, 1455–56 (2015) 
(reforming national security secrecy laws to permit more disclosure of information through formal 
means may reduce incentives to leak and could result in a better equilibrium between national security 
and government transparency); Pozen, supra note 169, at 581–82 (“Surely we would have less leaking 
of classified information if we had less classified information. Not only would there be fewer 
documents to pilfer, but people might treat the secrecy rules with more respect.”). 
260. Accord Rudesill, supra note 18, at 344; GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 68–69. 
261. See supra Part III. 
262. Accord GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 64–65. 
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oversight.263 
It is perhaps no surprise that multiple commentators have endorsed this same 
principle. Dakota Rudesill, writing about the problem of secret legislation 
enacted by Congress, has proposed that there should be public notices—or “bell 
ringers”—every time such a law is enacted.264 Elizabeth Goitein of the Brennan 
Center for Justice made a similar proposal with respect to all varieties of secret 
law.265 I add my voice to that growing consensus. 
2. Minimizing the Tension Between Secrecy and Transparency 
Decisions to keep law secret implicate fundamental values about democratic 
decision making, self-governance, and individual liberty. Achieving an accept­
able accommodation between these values and countervailing considerations 
favoring secrecy require that secrecy be limited to circumstances where it is 
strictly necessary and amply justified. 
The five distinctions among secret law described in Part III offer a systematic 
way to think about minimizing the conflict between competing values favoring 
disclosure and secrecy. As discussed there, secret laws vary along a continuum 
with respect to the extent of their external effects, their unforeseeability and 
novelty, the level of granularity at which they are publicly disclosed, how 
tightly held the secret is kept (“depth”), and the expected duration of secrecy.266 
As a rule of thumb, secret laws will be most problematic from the perspective of 
transparency values when they fall toward one end of each continuum. There­
fore, requiring government officials to move secret laws as far as possible 
toward the less problematic end of these axes will minimize the tension between 
secrecy and transparency. 
In many cases it will be possible to shift a secret law along one or more axes 
to decrease the extent to which the law harms transparency values while 
incurring few, if any, marginal costs to national security. In any given case, it 
may be possible to (1) increase the level of granularity at which the law is 
disclosed, (2) avoid novel or unforeseen interpretations of law and instead 
conform secret law to settled public expectations,267 (3) build in limits on the 
duration of secrecy, and (4) decrease the depth of a secret by disclosing the 
secret law, at a minimum, to coordinate branches of government. To keep law 
secret, Executive Branch officials should be legally required to be attentive to 
each of these characteristics and also take into account the extent of the external 
effects that a secret law has on the public. 
In addition, decisions to keep the law secret should have to meet a higher 
burden of justification than ordinary secrecy determinations. The existing rules 
263. See supra Section II.A.2. 
264. Rudesill, supra note 18, at 344. 
265. GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 68–69. 
266. See supra Part III. 
267. Cf. Kerr, supra note 18, at 1514 (arguing ambiguity in statutes authorizing national security 
surveillance should be interpreted narrowly in favor of the individual and against the state). 
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governing classification impose a strikingly low bar: information can be classi­
fied whenever “unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be 
expected to result in damage to the national security.”268 This standard effec­
tively requires officials to identify the mere possibility of damage to national 
security, with no requirement to determine that such damage is actually likely to 
come about or to consider any countervailing public interest in disclosure. 
When it comes to keeping law secret, the burden should be higher.269 
A brief example from the context of surveillance law will illustrate how these 
strategies for limiting secret law can be profitably deployed in practice. The 
Snowden revelations about the scope of government surveillance authorized by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court provoked at least three significant 
government responses that ratcheted down the tension over secret law. 
First, the government began proactively disclosing a significant number of 
FISA court decisions.270 
See, e.g., James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Testimony at Open Hearing on Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Authorities, U.S. S. Select Comm. on Intelligence (Sept. 26, 2013), https:// 
icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/62344881129/remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-by-director-of [https:// 
perma.cc/T7KA-WFBW] (“Over the past three months, I’ve declassified and publicly released a series 
of documents related to both Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. I did that to facilitate informed public debate about the important 
intelligence collection programs that operate under these authorities.”). 
To be sure, the government has redacted these 
opinions—sometimes heavily—often in an apparent effort to omit specific 
factual and operational details.271 
See generally Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Mar. 27, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc­
032713.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTA5-XSS7]. 
But by releasing even redacted opinions, the 
government has effectively increased the granularity at which (previously) 
secret law is disclosed. 
Second, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act, which contains provi­
sions that specifically limit the depth, duration, and granularity of secret law.272 
In particular, the law now requires the government to conduct a declassification 
review of each FISC opinion that contains a “significant construction or interpre­
268. Exec. Order. No. 13,526 § 1.1(a)(4), 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) (emphasis added). In 
addition to this minimal showing of risk, three additional requirements must be met to classify 
information: an “original classification authority” must be the one to classify; the information must be 
“owned by, produced by or for, or [be] under the control of the United States Government;” and “the 
information [must] fall[] within one or more of the categories of” classifiable subject matter. Id. 
§ 1.1(a)(1)–(3). 
269. One concrete option is to borrow the stringent standard that governs secrecy in the Judicial 
Branch and other contexts in which the First Amendment right of access applies. In those circum­
stances, secrecy is permitted only to serve an “overriding interest based on findings that closure is 
essential to preserve higher values.” Dhiab v. Obama, 70 F. Supp. 3d 486, 493 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting 
Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). More to the point, the “party seeking 
closure must show a ‘substantial probability’ of harm to an ‘overriding interest,’”—more than merely a 
“‘reasonable likelihood’ of harm,” as with ordinary classification rules. See id. (quoting Press-Enter. 
Co., 478 U.S. at 13–15). In addition, “any limit on public access . . .  must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest,’” id. (quoting Press Enter., 464 U.S. at 510), and it must be effective in protecting the 
threatened interest. Press Enter., 478 U.S. at 14. 
270. 
271. 
272. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015). 
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tation of any provision of law.”273 It requires the government to disclose such 
opinions “to the greatest extent practicable,” in redacted form if necessary.274 
The government can avoid declassifying FISC decisions only if it determines 
that doing so is “necessary to protect . . .  national security . . . or  properly classi­
fied intelligence sources or methods,”275 but in that case the law still requires 
the government to disclose “an unclassified statement . . .  summarizing the 
significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law.”276 In addition 
to mandatory declassification, the USA FREEDOM Act also provides for 
outside, non-governmental lawyers to participate in FISC proceeding as amici 
curiae in important cases.277 The law gives the amicus access to any secret legal 
precedents or other materials relevant to the proceeding.278 
These provisions of the Act ratchet down the tension between secrecy and 
transparency along several of the axes I have identified. The law effectively 
requires the government to make any unforeseeable interpretations of law 
public. It implements a requirement to maximize the granularity of disclosure. It 
effectively limits the duration of secrecy by imposing an affirmative obligation 
on the government to disclose. And it reduces the depth of secrecy by allowing 
access to an outside amicus. 
A third post-Snowden reform further illustrates how the extent of secrecy can 
be modulated. Reversing its prior practice, the government now notifies defen­
dants when FISC-authorized surveillance has been used to develop evidence in 
the case.279 
273. 50 U.S.C. § 1872(a) (2015). 
274. See id. § 1872(b). 
275. See id. § 1872(c)(1). 
276. See id. § 1872(c)(2). 
277. See id. § 1803(i). 
278. See id. § 1803(i)(6)(A)(i). 
279. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161, 1170–71 
(2015); Jameel Jaffer & Patrick C. Toomey, The Solicitor General Should Correct the Record in 
Clapper, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 18, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2219/solicitor-general-correct­
record-clapper [https://perma.cc/TQ8D-VPVS]; Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to 
Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-legal­
shift-may-open-door-for-challenge-to-secret-wiretaps.html?mcubz=3 [https://nyti.ms/2tZDU3H]. 
This policy change effectively decreases the depth of secrecy 
around FISC decisions by bringing criminal defendants and ordinary Article III 
courts into the loop. 
This is but one example of how concerns about secret law may be ratcheted 
down by modulating disclosure along each characteristic. Although the particu­
lar methods of increasing disclosure may vary from case to case, the objective 
remains the same: to minimize the conflict between transparency values and 
secrecy concerns. 
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3. Governing Secret Law According to Public Rules Democratically Adopted 
and Judicially Enforced 
Of course, it may not be possible to modulate the characteristics of a given 
secret law in a way that fully reconciles interests in transparency and secrecy.280 
There can be genuine impasses between secrecy and transparency. The question 
is how the legal system should resolve such stalemates. How, as an institutional 
matter, should we decide whether the law stays secret? 
I propose two institutional reform principles in response. First, both Congress 
and the Executive should be required to agree about when secret law is 
appropriate. At a minimum, the rules governing secret law should themselves be 
debated and established in public through the ordinary legislative process. 
Second, these rules limiting secret law should be subject to independent judicial 
enforcement. The basic intuition here is that if we are to have secret law at all, 
then the scope and limits of secret law must be established in the most 
democratically respectable way we know: via the ordinary, public legislative 
process, subject to public and independent oversight through the courts. 
Congressional action to rein in secret law could of course take multiple 
forms. Congress could, for example, require the government to disclose all 
secret laws unless it obtains specific, case-by-case legislative authorization.281 
More practicably, Congress could amend existing transparency laws—notably, 
FOIA—to tighten the legal framework governing the practice of secret law. I 
elaborate the latter option here. 
Such amendments would affirm that the automatic disclosure provisions of 
FOIA apply to all types of legal texts that officials regard as binding as a matter 
of practice. This would reverse the trend in recent jurisprudence toward finding 
that authoritative legal opinions, like those of the OLC, do not constitute agency 
law.282 
The amendments would further specify heightened procedural and substan­
tive requirements for withholding agency law. Congress could clarify that 
ordinary national security and law enforcement exemptions cannot be used to 
withhold internal rules and other agency laws—just as the courts have long 
recognized that the ordinary Exemption 5 protection for deliberative process 
280. See Kris, supra note 137, at 275–76 (explaining government sought for years to find ways to 
disclose FISC opinions without compromising the underlying programs but was unable to do so). 
281. A case-by-case approach could be enacted by imposing a strict time limit on how long laws 
may be kept secret without specific congressional authorization. Congress could, for example, require 
the Executive to provide an annual report listing secret legal opinions, rules, and other legally binding 
instruments, and further require that all such texts be published within twelve months unless Congress 
endorses continued secrecy through subsequent legislation. This kind of statute would effectively 
impose a uniform sunset provision on all secret laws, making transparency the default rule. Of course, 
such a law would impose a significant decisional burden on Congress and, in any case, sunset 
provisions in national security legislation have not turned out to be particularly effective checks on the 
Executive. See generally Berman, supra note 157 (discussing the effectiveness of sunset rules in the 
national security context). 
282. See supra notes 244–47. 
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and attorney–client communications do not apply to agency law.283 
In place of those exemptions, Congress could craft a new framework govern­
ing internal law. Consistent with the principles already articulated above, this 
framework would require that agencies meet a higher burden of justification to 
withhold legal texts.284 The framework could also require agencies to make a 
series of specific certifications explaining whether they had considered all 
means of reducing the degree of secrecy and why no further disclosure was 
possible. These certifications could specifically track the five key characteristics 
of problematic secret laws identified in this Article. Thus, Congress could 
affirmatively require the agency to explain and justify whether it has disclosed a 
given secret law in as much granular detail as possible, whether it has withheld 
secret laws containing unforeseeable content or that have significant external 
effects, and whether it has set strict limits on the duration of secrecy—perhaps 
with a requirement to recertify the need for secrecy on a regular basis. Congress 
could also require the agency to consider explicitly whether the specific reasons 
for secrecy outweigh the public interest in disclosure and the transparency 
values that militate against secrecy. 
Equally important, such a reform would enhance the role of the courts by 
vesting them with authority to review the sufficiency of Executive Branch 
certifications, explanations, and justifications with respect to each of these 
requirements.285 A reform law could also vest the courts with the power to order 
the government to create and disclose public summaries of internal law—a 
power that the courts do not currently have under FOIA—so as to enforce a 
maximum disclosure obligation.286 
This arrangement would build on the enduring structure that FOIA has 
created to govern executive secrecy in general, replicating it with respect to 
secret law in particular. FOIA abolished a system of unilateral executive discre­
tion, establishing in its place a system that dispersed authority over government 
secrets.287 Under FOIA, Congress sets the boundaries between public informa­
tion and legitimate secrets by enumerating nine exemptions.288 The courts 
police that boundary by engaging in de novo review and ordering disclosure of 
283. See supra notes 231–34. 
284. See supra note 269 (proposing a standard borrowed from the First Amendment right of access). 
285. Of course, the courts have often been inclined to defer when faced with government officials 
strenuously arguing that disclosure would cause harm to important national interests. See generally 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR (1990) (examining the shifting and often deferential posture of the courts toward the Executive 
on national security matters). But the proposal offered here would mitigate this tendency by requiring 
greater internal deliberation within the Executive Branch and by requiring courts not to engage in a 
general assessment of the risks to national security and instead to assess whether the government has 
adequately proven that no further steps can be taken to increase transparency. 
286. Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1872(a) (2012) (requiring the Director of National Intelligence to prepare 
unclassified summaries of FISC opinions). 
287. See supra notes 215–16, 226–29 and accompanying text. 
288. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012). 
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material improperly withheld.289 The public can press this system of checks and 
balances into action simply by filing suit seeking disclosure. The genius of 
FOIA was to split the atom of executive secrecy among all three branches and 
the public.290 The framework statute I have proposed is meant to have the same 
effect with respect to secret law. 
Just as FOIA wrested control from the Executive Branch over government 
secrecy in general, a strong framework statute for secret law is meant to replace 
a system of executive discretion with one governed by stringent criteria estab­
lished by Congress and enforceable by the courts and public. The hope is that 
by cabining executive discretion, such reforms would shift the legal equilibrium 
to a position that better respects the transparency values that militate against 
secrecy. 
B. FORCING PUBLIC DELIBERATION OVER SECRET LAW: A ROLE FOR THE COURTS 
The idea that Congress would take up, on its own initiative, something like 
the framework statute I have envisioned here may seem fantastical. Congress 
has acquiesced in the practice of secret law for the past fifteen years.291 In that 
time, it has legislated limits on secret law only once by requiring the disclosure 
of redacted FISA court opinions.292 And that reform was made only as a result 
of the fallout of the most spectacular and consequential leak of the last forty 
years. What could motivate Congress to upend the status quo? 
I end this Article by proposing a doctrinal innovation that would both limit 
the practice of secret law and force more robust congressional participation in 
the ecosystem regulating secret law: the courts should adopt a constitutional 
presumption against secret law. Specifically, the courts should adopt a canon of 
statutory interpretation that statutes will not be read to permit secret law unless 
Congress has clearly and affirmatively said otherwise.293 Under this kind of 
clear statement rule, statutes that otherwise permit the government to withhold 
information would not suffice to authorize it to withhold law. Most notably, the 
Executive Branch could no longer keep legal texts secret on the basis of 
289. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
290. See U.S. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (“[FOIA is] broadly con­
ceived . . . to  permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view[,] and 
[it] attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly 
unwilling official hands.” (quoting Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973))). 
291. See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text. 
292. See 50 U.S.C. § 1872(a) (2012). In addition, Congress passed legislation in 2010 requiring the 
Executive Branch to share the legal basis of intelligence activities, including covert action, with 
Congress. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259 § 331, 124 Stat. 
2654, 2685 (2010) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 3092(a)(2), 3093(b)(2)); Rudesill, supra note 18, at 
298–300. That legislation, however, did not require any public disclosure. The law instead sought to 
make certain pockets of secret law a “shallower” secret. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying 
text. 
293. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (discussing clear statement 
rules). 
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ordinary FOIA exemptions for national security and law enforcement informa­
tion. Instead, the government would need to obtain specific congressional 
approval to keep law secret, for example, by enacting and following a frame­
work statute governing secret law along the lines proposed above.294 
1. A Constitutional Clear Statement Rule Against Secret Law as a 
Democracy-Forcing Mechanism 
A clear statement rule against secret law would serve the purpose of forcing 
Congress to deliberate about and determine the lawful parameters of secret law. 
At the same time, adopting a clear statement rule would not require the courts to 
make a final decision about whether a secret law stays secret or even to 
second-guess the government’s predictions of harm to national security.295 
Instead, a court that adopts a clear statement rule would simply be forcing a 
more robustly democratic decision about whether and when law should be kept 
secret.296 Indeed, a constitutional presumption against secret law casts the 
courts in a familiar role as guardians of the separation of powers, promoting 
checks and balances between the political branches. Indeed, this “democracy­
forcing” role is one that U.S. courts have repeatedly taken in post-9/11 national 
security disputes.297 
This solution also has the important consequence of shifting the burden of 
inaction onto the government. Currently, if Congress does nothing, secrecy 
prevails. A clear statement rule flips the presumption: if Congress does nothing, 
transparency prevails. This is a healthier scheme because it puts the onus on the 
Executive Branch to persuade Congress that secrecy is necessary, rather than 
putting the onus on transparency advocates outside government (who are at a 
severe informational and institutional disadvantage) to persuade Congress to act 
in favor of transparency. 
In addition, a clear statement rule would force a public decision on whether 
secret law is appropriate. Currently, the public can potentially be kept in the 
dark about the decision to keep law secret and the reasons motivating such 
decisions. Sometimes the public will be unaware that the secret law exists in the 
first place. By requiring Congress to specifically authorize secret law, the public 
294. This stands in contrast to previous case law, in which the court has observed that “there is no 
textual basis in FOIA for a freestanding ‘secret law doctrine.’” N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
872 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Had the court applied a presumption against secret law, the 
inquiry would not have been whether FOIA specifically removes secret law from the government’s 
power to withhold records, but rather whether the law specifically grants the government power to 
withhold law. 
295. See supra notes 240–47, 253 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ reluctance to order 
disclosure of information over the national security objections of government). 
296. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 132–35 (2006) (explaining that clear statement rules are a form of democracy-forcing 
statutory interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) 
(arguing clear statement rules amount to nondelegation rules forbidding the Executive from taking 
certain actions on its own). 
297. See Benson, supra note 22; Sunstein, supra note 22; Balkin, supra note 22. 
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will be on notice of what may be kept secret and will at least be able to 
participate in the second-order decision—through the ordinary legislative 
process—about whether and when to permit law to be kept secret. 
There are objections to this proposal. Clear statement rules have come under 
criticism as an inappropriate exercise of judicial power.298 Even if a court did 
adopt a clear statement rule against secret law in a particular case and ordered 
disclosure on that basis, Congress could simply respond by endorsing secrecy in 
that particular instance—rather than enacting a broader framework limiting 
secret law.299 Moreover, Congress’s involvement may not ensure that the line 
between secrecy and disclosure will be drawn in an appropriate place. To the 
contrary, Congress could decide to explicitly delegate broad secret lawmaking 
authority, only further entrenching the problematic practice. But requiring the 
entire legislative apparatus of government to decide when we will be governed 
by secret laws seems the best way to make such decisions in a democracy. The 
courts are in a unique position to force this kind of healthy democratic 
deliberation. 
2. Toward a Constitutional Clear Statement Rule Against Secret Law 
I conclude by briefly sketching the outlines of a legal argument in favor of 
recognizing the clear statement rule that I have proposed as a means of 
beginning to answer the problem of secret law. Courts typically recognize clear 
statement rules either to protect constitutional norms—often structural features 
of the Constitution such as federalism or state and tribal sovereignty—or to 
advance perceived public policy goals.300 A clear statement rule against secret 
law can be justified on both of these grounds. I hope by now to have made the 
policy argument against secret law301 and in favor of requiring Congress to 
speak clearly on the question.302 But I have not yet touched on the constitu­
tional implications of secret law. 
Although there is not space in this Article to fully explore the constitutional 
question, I nevertheless offer here a preliminary sketch of the various constitu­
tional provisions and doctrines that might be brought to bear in support of a 
constitutional presumption against secret law. For present purposes, I hope 
298. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 404 
(2010) (arguing the Constitution should not be read to include general constitutional values enforceable 
through clear statement rules, and instead constitutional values only “find concrete expression in many 
discrete constitutional provisions, which prescribe the means of implementing the value in question”). 
299. Cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 40 F. Supp. 3d 377, 380–82 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (recounting Congress’s enactment of a law specifically empowering the Secretary of Defense to 
withhold images of detainees being abused, in response to a judicial decision ordering those images 
disclosed). 
300. See Sunstein, supra note 296, at 330–37 (“[N]ondelegation canons fall in three principal 
categories. Some are inspired by the Constitution; others involve issues of sovereignty; still others have 
their foundations in public policy.”); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 293, at 596–97. 
301. See supra Parts II–III. 
302. See supra Section V.B.1. 
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merely to draw the contours within which such an argument might be con­
structed. A more sustained examination of the constitutional limits on secret law 
is a project for another day. 
Although there is no single provision of the Constitution forbidding secret 
law, there are a number of features of the Constitution’s text and structure that, 
taken together, strongly suggest a constitutional presumption that law will be 
public.303 
The most obvious of such provisions are the Presentment Clause and the 
Journal Clause. The latter, which requires each house of Congress to keep a 
“Journal of its Proceedings,” contains an explicit presumption in favor of 
openness: “Each House shall . . .  from time to time publish [its Journal], except­
ing such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.”304 Accordingly, the 
Constitution presumes that when each house passes bills and takes other actions 
it will do so in public, unless it specifically decides to do so in secret. The 
Presentment Clause, in turn, requires bills enacted by both houses to “be 
presented to the President of the United States; [i]f he approve he shall sign it, 
but if not he shall return it.”305 Although the Presentment Clause does not 
contain any explicit transparency provisions, it refers back to the Journal 
Clause, with its explicit presumption of openness.306 Taken together, the two 
clauses strongly suggest that the Constitution envisions lawmaking as a presump­
tively public process. 
Additional constitutional support for a presumption against secret law may be 
found in the First Amendment’s guarantees of the rights to freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and the right to petition. It is 
commonly understood that, among other purposes, these protections of the First 
Amendment are a “method of securing participation by the members of the 
society in social, including political, decision making.”307 But if the public is 
kept in the dark about the very law that governs, public participation in political 
decision making will be severely constrained. 
Similar considerations led the Supreme Court to recognize in the First 
Amendment a qualified right of access to courts and other official proceedings 
and records.308 In particular, the Court has held that where there is a tradition of 
303. This discussion draws upon the work of Heidi Kitrosser, David Pozen, Mark Rozell, and Adam 
Samaha, each of whom has discussed the constitutional status of secrecy in various contexts. See 
ROZELL, supra note 21, at 8–11, 20–29, 44–49; Kitrosser, supra note 21, at 514–15; Pozen, supra note 
21, at 292–323; Samaha, supra note 21, at 941–76. 
304. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
305. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
306. See id. (requiring the objections of the President exercising a veto to be entered on the Journal 
of the house where the bill originated, and requiring the votes for and against an override of the veto to 
be “entered on the Journal of each House respectively”). 
307. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878 
(1963). 
308. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (“People in an 
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what 
they are prohibited from observing.”). 
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openness to a particular proceeding, and where public access to the proceeding 
“plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question,” the First Amendment guarantees a qualified constitutional right of 
access to the public.309 These same rationales strongly support a constitutional 
right—or at least a constitutional presumption—of public access to secret 
law.310 
Moreover, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment may provide indepen­
dent grounds for a presumption against secret law.311 As Gregory Mark has 
recounted, the history of the right to petition in colonial America is a history of 
public participation in lawmaking: for early Americans, presenting a petition 
was the principal means of prompting legislative solutions to problems, seeking 
redress for wrongs, and otherwise participating in the legal governance of 
society.312 The Petition Clause may therefore be understood to protect the 
public’s right to participate directly in lawmaking, a right that is significantly 
impeded when the law itself is hidden from the public. 
Other features of the Constitution also support at least a presumption against 
secret law. For instance, the Constitution’s provisions for electing Representa­
tives, Senators, and the President suggest a presumption that the public knows 
what the law is. After all, public election of members of Congress to legislate 
would hardly be meaningful if the public could not know what laws have been 
enacted.313 The vesting clauses, too, suggest a presumption of openness, insofar 
as publicness is inherent in the exercise of the power to make law.314 
More broadly, the structure of the Constitution supports the broader principle 
that lawmaking is different from other kinds of governmental activity and that 
when the government withholds law from the public, it raises concerns that go 
well beyond those normally implicated by public access to government records. 
The Constitution is deeply concerned with lawmaking as a function of govern­
ment, specifying in great detail the manner in which the government can make 
law, circumscribing the power of the government to do so, apportioning this 
309. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986). 
310. Courts have recognized that the right of access is particularly crucial with respect to judicial 
opinions, precisely because they set out governing law. See Lowenschuss v. W. Pub. Co., 542 F.2d 180, 
185 (3d Cir. 1976) (“As ours is a common-law system based on the ‘directive force’ of precedents, its 
effective and efficient functioning demands wide dissemination of judicial decisions . . . .  Even that part 
of the law which consists of codified statutes is incomplete without the accompanying body of judicial 
decisions construing the statutes. Accordingly, under our system of jurisprudence the judiciary has the 
duty of publishing and disseminating its decisions.”). 
311. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
312. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to 
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2157, 2178–87 (1998). 
313. David Pozen has made this point with respect to the constitutional status of secrecy in general, 
explaining “[f]or federal elections to be meaningful . . . the  people must be aware of what their 
officeholders have been doing.” Pozen, supra note 21, at 295–96. 
314. Cf. Patrick Hayden, Access as an Article III Value: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
and the Public 49–80 (Apr. 18, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that the 
“judicial power” vested by Article III implies a judicial obligation to disclose binding precedent). 
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power among the federal and state governments, delegating to the Executive 
Branch the power to execute the laws, and otherwise regulating the lawmaking 
authority of government. To the extent that the Constitution can be read to 
contain some implicit restrictions on secrecy,315 they must be strongest with 
respect to the law itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Secret law has become a regular feature of governance in this country, 
particularly with respect to national security and law enforcement activities of 
government. The practice is deeply problematic from a number of perspectives. 
This Article attempts to clarify what is at stake in disputes over secret law to 
more rigorously assess the harms of secret law and to suggest how tensions 
between transparency and secrecy might be mitigated. Ultimately, however, to 
reconcile the basic tension between secret law and elementary constitutional 
commitments, it will be necessary to bring the practice out of the shadows and 
to require every branch of government—and the public, too—to participate in 
decisions over its proper place. 
315. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576–80 (1980) (holding First 
Amendment limits secrecy where there is a longstanding history of openness); id. at 589 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (explaining First Amendment limits secrecy where openness in a particular governmental 
process serves that process itself); Pozen, supra note 21, at 292–323 (arguing the Constitution forbids, 
at a minimum, “deep secrecy”—that is, it prohibits one branch of government from taking actions that 
no other branch of government is permitted to know exist); Samaha, supra note 21, at 963–68 (arguing 
courts could build on existing statutory structures, including FOIA, to enforce constitutionally grounded 
expansion or contraction of access rights based on the Constitution’s structural logic and its commit­
ment to democratic popular accountability). 
